CLOUDS, CAMERAS, AND COMPUTERS: THE FIRST
AMENDMENT AND NETWORKED PUBLIC PLACES

I. Introduction
It seems to be a common assumption that material places like parks,
sidewalks, and public squares and “cyber-places” like the Web constitute separate
locations of communication. In reality, however, the intersection and collision of
these two spaces is imminent. In some respects it has already occurred. Entire
cities and counties are erecting wireless “clouds” that will bring the internet to
vast public spaces.1 Technologies of surveillance continue to proliferate. What
one does and says in public places is increasingly subject to surveillance by
means of a combination of hand-held devices and official surveillance tools like
closed circuit television cameras (CCTV).2 There may soon be a continuous,
running record of most public activities. People in public places are also carrying
and wearing ever more sophisticated computing devices. Pervasive personal
computing is mobilizing communication and affecting public interaction in ways
we are only now beginning to appreciate. Among other things, it is blurring the
line between “private” and “public” communication. Anyone who has ever been
stuck in traffic behind a car in which a pornographic DVD is being displayed has
glimpsed this phenomenon. Like it or not, the era of “drive-by pornography” is
now upon us.3
Technology is altering the fundamental character of public places.
Increasingly, when we are in public, we occupy networked places.4 Some have
already noted the significant Fourth Amendment privacy concerns raised by the
1
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networking of public places.5 These concerns will be exacerbated as the
technologies of communication and surveillance become more widespread and
more sophisticated. The networking of public places will also give rise to a host
of less-commented upon free speech issues.6 Place is a critical component of
expressive activity.7 The transformation of material public places into networked
ones will fundamentally change what it means to speak, petition, and associate in
public.
This Article provides a comprehensive assessment of the First
Amendment issues related to the networking of public places. The changes
brought about by the networking of public places will affect a number of First
Amendment doctrines and principles. The Article considers five basic categories
or clusters of speech issues raised by the networking of public places: Property or
public forum, public captivity, protection (from harmful speech), public protest,
privacy (in terms of both identity and thought), and press.
Having cities and other governmental entities, rather than private interests,
provide public wireless internet connections raises questions about ownership,
control, access, and neutrality. Are these public wireless networks just another
public utility? Are they speech forums? Will governments, or their private
partners, be able to filter public Web access? Is there a constitutional right to
public connectivity and access in the same sense that there is a right to the streets?
Will governments, or their state-actor private partners, have unfettered access to
information about public network users?
Public “captivity” will also become a larger concern. As the drive-by
pornography example shows, the networking of public places will expose
audiences to speech in public that has to this point been either entirely private or
effectively segregated in material places. Sexually explicit content and ubiquitous
advertising will be more prevalent in networked places. Citizens will carry this
content with them into the networked public square. We will all potentially be
more “captive” in networked public places – on buses, in subway cars, in parks
and government buildings -- to speech that we have generally been able to avoid
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in material public places.8 To what extent can or should the law protect listeners
and viewers from this expression?
As the captivity problem indicates, exposure to harmful speech in
networked public places will become increasingly difficult to regulate. The
networking of public places will alter the form and character of public expression.
It will, for example, permit speakers through devices to “virtually” approach
listeners and viewers. Networking features will alter time and space, thus
affecting concepts such as imminence and risk that have been critical to doctrines
like fighting words, threats, and incitement to unlawful action. As public places
become networked, we must consider what form of protection will be available
when viewers and listeners encounter such things as mobile sexually explicit
speech, “virtual” harassment, cyber-spamming, and other forms of harmful speech
in public places.
The networking of public places will also substantially affect public
protests and demonstrations. Networking features will facilitate assembly by
providing platforms for social capital and the means for spontaneous action. But
they will also facilitate official and unofficial surveillance, as public and private
cameras record events in the public square. On balance, will the networking of
public places render self-governing activities like protesting and petitioning too
costly for most citizens?
The devices we carry, outfitted with Global Positioning System (GPS)
technologies, will facilitate surveillance and tracking.
The networked
environment will compel us to constantly authenticate ourselves. Vast public
areas will be placed under more or less constant surveillance. In light of these
things, will the ability to shield speaker or associative identity be fundamentally
compromised?
Looking somewhat further in the future, will biometric
technologies, including those that can literally “read” faces, expose even private
thoughts? Will digital environments compel us to speak in public against our
will?
Finally, in a networked environment should every citizen with the capacity
to record and publish be deemed a member of the “press”? Should the truthful
“reporting” of public events by citizen-journalists be shielded by the First
Amendment from tort and other forms of civil liability, even when it impinges on
significant public privacy concerns?
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Serious First Amendment concerns will be raised as the networking of
public places proceeds. First Amendment doctrines and principles will be
challenged by this transformation, just as they have been challenged by
technological revolutions in the past. But the stakes of spatial networking are
actually much higher than these doctrinal concerns indicate. We are talking
ultimately about a fundamental makeover of public places. Although they serve
many purposes, public places are a collective democratic and expressive concern.
They facilitate identity and equality claims. They allow for a wide variety of
democratic participation. They lend transparency to both expressive claims and
regulation of public expression. While we are considering First Amendment
concerns, we ought also to ask how networked public places will affect core
speech values like self-government and civic interaction in the traditional public
marketplace of ideas. What will all of this networking do to public places?
The networking of public places will alter the nature, character, and
democratic functions of public places and public expression. It will influence
who speaks, where they may communicate, and what they will say. It will render
speakers more knowable to authorities, but in many cases less knowable to one
another. People will increasingly interact with devices in public, rather than with
one another. Digitization will make some speech, and most speech regulation,
less transparent to all of us. All of these changes threaten to render public places
less capable of serving their traditional democratic functions.
The Article proceeds as follows. Part II will describe the networking of
public places – the technological, social, and environmental changes that are
transforming material public places. Part III will address the substantive First
Amendment issues -- public forum, public captivity, protection from harmful
speech, protest, privacy, and press -- raised by the networking of public places.
Part IV will look beyond these doctrinal considerations. Drawing upon urban
geography and sociology literature, it will critically examine the civic character of
networked public places in light of the First Amendment functions and values
public places ideally ought to serve.

II.

Networked Public Places

Much of First Amendment doctrine has developed with regard to a
material model of public places. Public expression has taken place in a familiar
cluster of places, from malls to public squares to public parks. The first section of
this Part will describe the general characteristics of public expression in material,
non-networked public places. It will also touch upon the principal speech
doctrines that have developed in this physical environment. The second section
of this Part describes the primary network technologies that will or are already reshaping public places and public expression. There are three basic developments.
4
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First, governments are currently providing, or partnering with private actors to
provide, wireless internet access in vast public areas. Second, governments have
installed and are continuing to install surveillance equipment, including hundreds
of thousands of CCTV monitors, in many public places. Third, individuals are
carrying and wearing advanced communications technologies in public places.
These devices will communicate with other devices and with the environment
itself, which is also becoming embedded with computing devices.
A. Speech in Material Public Places
In understanding the effect that the networking of public places will have
on public expression, it is useful to begin with a brief discussion of the expressive
characteristics that have traditionally defined material public places. In material
places, the principles of geography, physicality, anonymity and equality have
largely determined the contours of public expression.
The geography of material public places consists of bricks, mortar, and
other tangible features. This geography provides the basic framework for public
expression. In theory, the scope of public speech rights depends upon the
geographic location the speaker inhabits. Thus, public streets, parks, and
sidewalks are “quintessential” public forums in which speech rights are at their
apex.9 These places have “immemorially” been open for expressive purposes.10
Most other places may or may not be open to expression, more or less at the
government’s discretion.11 Under the public forum and time, place, and manner
doctrines, governments are entitled to maintain public and quasi-public places
such that they effectively serve their primary purposes.12 The primary purpose of
most public and quasi-public places – the reason they were constructed – relates
to concerns other than expression, such as traffic flow, travel, the provision of
services, or recreation.13
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of public fora).
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the intent requirement).
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The government’s relationship to geography or place is essentially that of
property manager or proprietor. Governments own the streets, parks, and other
public places, in the sense that they have title to them. Governments have been
responsible for providing whatever improvements or upgrades are necessary for
the continued functioning of these places. Formally governments have no interest
in, indeed are forbidden from regulating, the content that is delivered by speakers
to audiences on the streets, or in the parks, or in other public places.14
Governments have never had any formal constitutional obligation to facilitate
expression by building new places for it. Access to existing forums, however, has
always been nominally available to all members of the public, regardless of
means or status. There have never been “fast” public expression lanes on the
streets for those with greater means.15
In their capacity as proprietors, governments have always observed and
regulated public places. But they have done so mostly to ensure that a basic sense
of order and decorum prevails there. Although there has always been some
policing of public places, such activities have been subject to realities such as
limited funding and manpower. Thus, at any given moment, most public places
have not been policed at all – in the sense that official eyes are focused upon
them.
The geography of public places has itself been used to police and regulate
public expression. The transmission of obscenity and other illegal content can be
prohibited altogether, the Supreme Court has held, in order to produce a certain
“quality of life” and “tone of commerce” in public places.16 The time, place, and
manner doctrine permits governments to zone or spatially restrict any speech it
wishes, so long as it does so in a content-neutral fashion and leaves ample
alternative avenues of communication available.17 In recent years officials have
become quite expert at this zoning.18 Sexually explicit expression has been
dispersed or concentrated spatially in order, purportedly, to combat the
“secondary effects” associated with it.19 Political displays of contention have
increasingly been subjected to expressive zoning of various forms.20 Zoning has
14

See Perry, 460 U.S. at 45 (describing content neutrality requirement).
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become a very efficient means of sanitizing large public areas of expression that
many find quite offensive, harmful, or even just aesthetically distasteful.21
Geography and spatiality work in this fashion because public expression is
itself physical, tangible, and grounded. It has been connected to material places.
This connection has rendered most public expression open and transparent.
Confrontations, incitements to action, and demonstrations have generally been
seen, experienced, and lived events. This fundamental fact has substantially
shaped the contours of doctrines typically applied in public speech contexts.
Threats, for example, require that the recipient have some reasonable fear of
physical harm.22 A cross burning several feet from a back yard probably suffices
to create the requisite fear.23 Invitations to brawls (so-called “fighting words”),
incitements to unlawful actions, and the idea of audience “hostility” all are based
on elements of proximity, immediacy, and visibility.24 These content categories
and scenarios can be effectively regulated under circumstances where the speech
or speech acts can be witnessed, proved, and hence prosecuted. This was the
underlying assumption when each of these categories was created.
Of course, the vast majority of public expression is neither illegal nor
harmful to viewers or listeners. There is thus no reason to police it. As we go
about our public lives, from sitting on a park bench reading a book to engaging in
assemblies and peaceful protests with others, we expect that we are doing so
anonymously.25 In public places we are not, of course, anonymous in the sense
that our identities are wholly private and cannot be discovered.26 But when
engaged in speech activities in public places, there is at least some minimal right
not to disclose one’s identity. Thus, in McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission,27
the Court invalidated an election law that prohibited the circulation of anonymous
leaflets in connection with political campaigns. The retention of anonymity in
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this circumstance is “a shield from the tyranny of the majority.”28 It can be relied
upon to “protect unpopular individuals from retaliation – and their ideas from
suppression – at the hand of an intolerant society.”29
Further, whether or not we are engaged in core political pamphleteering,
we still expect that much of what we do in public will remain un-remarked upon
and unrecorded. We expect to blend into what Allan Westin has called the
“situational landscape.”30 One can of course effectively undermine or even waive
such an expectation. He may, for example, publicly burn a United States flag to
garner attention for a cause or message.31 But barring this sort of activity,
speakers in material public places quite reasonably have assumed that they can
blend into a crowd.
This expectation has doubtless contributed to the shape of our public
expressive culture. It has provided critical space for difference in public
expression. That is not to say that speech in material public places is altogether
free-wheeling, particularly in light of the proliferation of spatial controls and
social norms that have limited it. But our public expressive culture has
historically been one that has tolerated expression that is disruptive, boisterous,
loud, and unconventional. I material public places an expectation of public
anonymity has provided speakers the freedom to engage in public displays that
might otherwise have been substantially chilled.
Finally, in terms of general principles, material public places have
historically been equalizing or leveling forces. Those lacking the means for more
sophisticated expression have tended to use the facilities of public places to
convey messages that might otherwise have been silenced by market forces.
Many “poorly financed causes of little people” have relied upon places like
streets, sidewalks, and areas surrounding facilities like airports, train stations, and
public buildings to garner attention and convey messages.32 In this sense and
others public places and public expression have played a critical democratizing
role in our society. Note, again, that because this expression has been tangible
and public, it has been quite difficult to ignore. At the least, public places have
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provided “little people” an opportunity to interrupt the daily routine of public life
and to force some consideration of their claims.
The elements of geography, physicality, anonymity, and equality have
substantially shaped the nature and tenor of our public expressive culture. As the
next section shows, the networking of public places will affect each of these
elements.
B.

The Networking of Public Places

As mentioned, there are three primary features associated with the
networking of public places. The first is the establishment, by governmental
entities, of vast public internet access networks. The second is the continued
proliferation of surveillance devices that continuously record public activity. And
the third is pervasive and mobile personal computing in public places. This
process of spatial networking will fundamentally change how information is
conveyed, shared, and received in public places. It will alter the manner in which
public places are policed and regulated. It will challenge and strain each of the
fundamental precepts of material public places – geography, physicality,
anonymity, and equality -- discussed above.
1.

Wireless Clouds – “Muni WiFi”

Urban “hot spots,” where anyone with the proper device could connect to
the internet, have been around for years. Some of the earliest wireless fidelity
(“WiFi”) networks were patched together by internet anarchists bent on creating a
wireless commons.33 Other early WiFi networks were the result of corporatesponsored initiatives, meant to draw people to Starbucks and other quasi-public
places, and keep them there. For the first time, people were able to stay
connected even while outside the home or office.
These were relatively small-scale experiments. But the early projects
forecast an imminent intersection of so-called “cyberplaces” and material places
on a much grander scale.34 As the proprietors of vast public places, including
many rural ones where internet connectivity was spotty or simply non-existent,
governments eventually became interested in providing WiFi to their citizenries.
Wi-Fi is now draped over vast areas of public space. More than 200 cities,
counties, and regions are currently providing or planning to provide some form of
33

See generally Kevin Werbach, Supercommons: Toward A Unified Theory of Wireless
Communication, 82 TEX. L. REV. 863 (2004) (explaining concept of the commons).
34
For a critique of the notion that “cyberplaces” constitute actual places, see generally Cohen,
supra note --
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public wireless internet access.35 Increasing areas are now covered with wireless
“clouds” or “meshes,” as the networks are often called. For example, Suffolk
County on Long Island has installed a network that will reach some 1.5 million
people and cover 900 square miles.36 Philadelphia’s new WiFi network will
cover most of the city’s approximately 135 square miles. San Francisco is taking
bids for an ambitious WiFi project. New York City has already installed wireless
“hot spots” in many of its vast park areas. New clouds are rising over cities and
suburbs every day. Indeed, entire states aspire to become unified wireless
communications networks.37
Muni WiFi networks will provide public access to the internet – in parks,
squares, public buildings, airport terminals, and literally wherever else citizens
can carry their remote computing devices.38 Some networks, like New York’s,
will provide free connectivity, at least for now. Other municipalities, concerned
about expenses associated with developing and operating the wireless networks,
plan to charge citizens for access. Some, like San Francisco, even plan to offer
“premium” connectivity for a fee, while relegating free users to a much slower
connection speed.
There may be enormous educational and expressive benefits to Muni
WiFi. In many rural communities, Muni WiFi will help close the digital divide.39
It will enable activities like distance learning, coordinated policing and other
public services, and the provision of vast amounts of information to citizens.
Despite these benefits, Muni WiFi has been a controversial undertaking. Until
now, the provision of internet access has primarily been a private venture.
Bowing to pressure from the telecommunications industry, fifteen state
legislatures have prohibited municipalities from offering public WiFi access.40
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For a lost of the cities and regions that have developed muni WiFi plans or already have
operational networks, see http://muniwireless.com/municipal/1227/
36
Id.
37
See Jesse Noyes, Rhode Island Plans Statewide WiFi Network, Boston Herald, May 1, 2006
(available at www.technewsworld.com/story/50262.html).
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advertising revenue, the vast majority of the networks are subsidized. Some cities, like San
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See Tim Gnatek, “Switchboard in the Sky: Municipal Wi-Fi Helps Fill Gaps In the Digital
Map,” The New York Times, May 3, 2006, G1.
40
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http://news.com.com/Municipal+broadband+and+wireless+projects+map/2009-1034_35690287.html?tag=nl. The bills are described at http://muniwireless.com/municipal/579.
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Congress is currently considering proposed legislation that would institute a
nationwide ban, although the prospects for enactment appear slim.41
The principal arguments against Muni WiFi are based on efficiency
concerns and the purported lack of need for the service. Telecom interests
contend that there is no shortage of supply or market gap to fill. Supporters of
Muni WiFi suggest that the bottom line is the bottom line: Telecom companies
want to provide public wireless access and reap the profits. On the merits,
supporters argue that Muni WiFi is simply another utility -- like electricity, roads,
sewers, and water – that government should provide. Some, like San Francisco’s
Mayor, Gavin Newsom, have argued that internet access is a “fundamental right”
for the modern citizen.
Whatever the merits of the economic and rights arguments, efforts to stall
or prevent the spread of Muni WiFi appear to be going nowhere. Public access to
the internet is already or will become a reality in most large urban centers, an
increasing number of suburbs, and many rural areas that have thus far been underserved in terms of internet access.
Consideration of the full effects of Muni WiFi on public places and public
expression must await a description of the remainder of the process for
networking public areas. I will return to some of the themes sketched here in
Parts III and IV. But one can readily surmise some of the effects wireless clouds
may have on the public expressive environment.
Wireless clouds will alter the fundamental geography of material public
places. To some extent they bring us closer to exploding the very concept of
“place” itself. Cyberspace scholars often speak of the Web and other venues as
separate “virtual” spaces.42 But with public wireless access and other pervasive
computing technologies, as described below, where one happens to be will
become far less important to one’s ability to communicate. To some extent terms
like “online” and “offline” will cease to matter.
On-the-ground expression will be affected by wireless clouds floating
above public places. The clouds will facilitate mobile communication and public
information access. In networked public areas, private and public speech will mix
and blend, as people bring the Web with them into public places. As a result,
geography and place will become less reliable tools for restricting access and

41

There are dueling proposals in Congress. One proposal would overturn the fifteen state bans,
allowing municipalities and other state subdivisions to undertake WiFi projects. See “Community
Broadband Act of 2005, ” S. 1294, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (2005).
42
See Cohen, supra note --.
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exposure to information that is harmful, offensive, or simply irritating. The Web
will spill into public places.
The manner in which public speakers and audiences interact will also be
affected by all of this cloud cover. Tangible and physical forms of expression
will be replaced by virtual communications of various types. We are already an
increasingly distracted people in public areas. Add to the cell phone and the MP3
player mobile devices that connect with the internet no matter where in public one
happens to be, and people will be even more likely to engage devices rather than
one another. The noise of the streets and parks will be replaced more and more
by quiet concentration on personal screens. The very sights and sounds of public
expression will change.
Wireless clouds will facilitate official and unofficial surveillance of public
acts, including expression, association, and information-gathering. This will
threaten public anonymity. Will the books or newspapers I am reading “online”
as I sit on a park bench be recorded? Will my associations arouse suspicion?
Will I even know?
The participants in public speech rituals and displays may also change.
For those without personal computing devices, with no access or perhaps very
slow access, the nature of public places will become that much more alienating
and foreign. The digital divide some experience at home will now go public,
with new classes of haves and have-nots in public areas.43 Public places may thus
be less of an equalizing force.
2.

Surveillance Square

Surveillance of public and quasi-public activities is not a new
phenomenon. Private and quasi-public places have been under the camera’s
watchful eye since at least the late 1950s.44 Banks were very early adopters.
They used closed circuit television networks (CCTV) to monitor their vaults and
their customers. Other commercial places, like malls and department stores, have
also long placed customers and spaces under surveillance.45
Two things, however, are very different in the modern era. The first is the
prevalence of public surveillance, in terms of both the numbers of cameras and
43

On the scope of penetration of innovative technologies into low-income urban areas, see
generally HIGH TECHNOLOGY AND LOW-INCOME COMMUNITIES: PROSPECTS FOR THE POSITIVE
USE OF ADVANCED INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY (Donald A Shon, et al. eds., 1999).
44
Quentin Burrows, Scowl Because You’re On Candid Camera: Privacy and Video Surveillance,
31 VAL. U. L. REV. 1079, 1080 (1997).
45
Id.

12

THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND NETWORKED PUBLIC PLACES
the quantity of space they cover. The second is the technology itself, which
enables surveillance that differs vastly in quality -- that is, in the degree of its
potential intrusiveness -- from past generations.
Surveillance technology has become a mainstay of quintessentially public
places like streets, city centers, and parks. The proliferation began in the streets,
as officials sought new and efficient ways to police street crime.46 Municipalities
have long trained cameras on high-crime areas.47 They later used camera
technologies for other purposes, for instance to cheaply and efficiently monitor
traffic and issue citations for traffic violations.
Heightened security concerns, especially since the attacks on September
11, 2001, have led to the further proliferation of public surveillance.48 The United
States has not yet reached the surveillance heights of Great Britain, “the champion
of CCTV surveillance” with between two and three million public cameras in
operation.49 But we are merely at the start of developing a surveillance society.
Already hundreds of thousands of CCTV cameras are watching over our public
places. One scholar has suggested that video surveillance will likely “increase
exponentially in the next decade.”50
As one might expect, surveillance has recently become more prevalent in
cities that may be at greatest risk from terrorist attacks. New York City has just
begun to install and operate an extensive public surveillance system.51 The city
plans a first installment of 500 cameras, at a cost of $9 million, with more to
follow depending on the amount of funds received from the federal Department of
Homeland Security.52 Ultimately the plan is to have several thousand wireless
video cameras positioned atop lamp posts and on public buildings. New York
46

See generally Raymond Surette, Video Street Patrol: Media Technology and Street Crime, 13
POLICE SCI. & ADMIN. 78 (1985).
47
Id. The primary official justification for these extensive official surveillance systems has been
crime detection and prevention. There is a serious debate concerning whether this justification is
empirically defensible. See Slobogin, supra note -- at 224-230 (surveying evidence on crime
prevention and deterrence).
48
There are also many privately maintained and operated video surveillance systems that are
trained on public spaces. Many of the video feeds from these cameras can be linked to publicly
operated surveillance systems. See Slobogin, supra note -- at 222.
49
Id. at 222. British experience with CCTV has been extensively scrutinized. For a review of the
literature, see Stephen Greenhalgh, Literature Review of Privacy and Surveillance Affecting Social
Behavior (August 2003) (on file with author).
50
Slobogin, supra note -- at 219. See also Simon G. Davies, Re-Engineering the Right to Privacy:
How Privacy Has Been Transformed from a Right to a Commodity, in TECHNOLOGY AND
PRIVACY: THE NEW LANDSCAPE 150 (Phillip E. Agre & Marc Rotenberg eds. (1997) (estimating
20-30% annual increase in public video surveillance).
51
See Tom Hays, Associated Press, NYPD Employs First of 500 Security Cameras, April 16,
2006, available at http://www.officer.com.
52
Id.
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City officials envision a “ring of steel” in parts of Lower Manhattan, one that
resembles the plan recently implemented in London’s financial district. The
public surveillance plan is not limited to Manhattan. It calls for placing
surveillance cameras throughout the five boroughs.53
Surveillance of
underground public areas is also already widespread. New York City now has
1,000 cameras in its subway system, and expects to have over 2,000 in place by
2008.54
The District of Columbia has also experienced a rapid rise in public
surveillance. Large areas in and around the capitol are under the jurisdiction of
both local and federal authorities. The Metropolitan Police Department has a
relatively modest public surveillance program. In 2002, for example, police used
nineteen automated surveillance cameras to watch anti-war protests and a “March
for Life” event.55 The police department’s cameras are located in areas
throughout the National Mall and surrounding areas. They target especially those
places where marches and protests typically occur.
The National Park Service also operates surveillance cameras in and
around various federal properties in the District, including the National Mall.56
Unlike the D.C. surveillance system, which so far has been used primarily during
large public events, the Park Service’s system is always operational.57 Thus if
you are near the White House, for example, or the Vietnam Memorial you are
under surveillance.
Other large urban areas are increasingly implementing large-scale public
surveillance projects. Chicago recently spent $5 million on a 2,000-camera
system, one of the nation’s most extensive. Washington and Philadelphia have
made similar investments. The phenomenon is not limited to large cities,
however. Municipalities like Tampa, Florida and Memphis, Tennessee, and even
smaller places all have recently invested in public surveillance programs.58 As
Department of Homeland Security grant money continues to flow to communities
53

Id.
Id.
55
See Derrill Holly, Police Surveillance Cameras to be Used During Washington Protests,
ASSOCIATED PRESS, available at www.commondreams.org, December 21, 2002.
56
See United States General Accounting Office, Report to the Chairman, Committee on
Government Reform, House of Representatives, Video Surveillance: Information on Law
Enforcement’s Use of Closed Circuit Television to Monitor Selected Federal Property in
Washington, D.C. (June 2003).
57
Id. at 15. The District is considering authorizing daily use of surveillance cameras in certain
areas. See Gary Emerling, District Will Be Looking At You, THE WASHINGTON TIMES, March 16,
2006.
58
See Slobogin, supra note -- at 220 (Newark, N.J., Tampa, Fl., Virginia Beach, Va., and
Memphis, Tenn., all have cameras, ranging in number from six to seventy-two, that cover large
areas of public real estate”).
54
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across the country, CCTV systems will likely become more and more prevalent in
public areas.
The latest generation of surveillance cameras has exceptional capabilities.
Most have panning and tilting features. Some have zoom lenses “that can read
the wording on a cigarette packet at 100 yards and bring nighttime images up to
daylight level.”59 More advanced systems have features like motion detectors,
facial recognition, biometric technology, and even see-through capabilities.60 The
records these machines create is also different. Older technologies relied on
conventional videotape for information storage. Newer CCTV technology relies
upon digitization.61 This makes it easier to store information for much longer
periods of time.
These advances are remarkable. As one organization recently put it,
“[w]hat was once the grist of science fiction novels is quickly becoming the
reality of modern law enforcement.”62 With these surveillance technologies, it
will be possible for authorities to identify, trace, and continually track a person
the moment he enters the public square.63 It will be possible to read what each
citizen is reading, to see who he sees, to know where he has been and perhaps
where he is going. It may at some point be possible to literally read his face, in
the sense of learning from facial expressions. Much of this monitoring will be
automated. The cameras will not operate in isolation. Along with public wireless
networks and, as explained below, pervasive personal computing, they will be
merely one aspect of a larger information network embedded in public places.
The information collected will not merely disappear once the person leaves the
public square. It will be retained. It may become part of a digital dossier.
The proliferation of public surveillance raises serious privacy concerns. In
terms of public expression, these developments may change the geography of
public space by marking off vast areas that will now be under public surveillance.
Officials will no longer be limited to policing expression that they happen to

59

Id. at 222.
Id. at 223.
61
Id.
62
The Constitution Project, Guidelines for Public Video Surveillance: A Guide To Protecting
Communities And Preserving Civil Liberties (2006), available at www.constitutionproject.org .
63
In the UK, officials are preparing to initiate Celldar, a project that will permit surveillance of
individuals based on the signals emitted from their cellphones. The system will allow officials to
watch vehicles and individuals almost anywhere and any time, from up to hundreds of miles away.
See Jason Burke and Peter Warren, How Mobile Phones Let Spies See Our Every Move,
GUARDIAN UNLIMITED, October 13, 2002, available at
http://www.guardian.co.uk/mobile/article/0,2763,811034,00.html.
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witness on the scene and in real time. A less transparent but more efficient spatial
regulatory regime will facilitate continuous policing of public areas.64
Even if citizens do not know the details of surveillance, they will know
that they are being watched. This may affect the books they read in public, the
protests they are willing to participate in, and the displays they are willing to take
part in while in public places. Of course, the expectation of public anonymity will
be undermined, if not entirely eliminated. The choice to reveal oneself, and one’s
actions, will no longer be the speaker’s.
In terms of equality, certain “undesirable” populations, like the homeless
or public agitators, may be displaced from certain areas. Those without the
proper digital identification may be prevented from entering areas of the public
square at all.
3.

Pervasive Computing and Mobile Technologies

There is, finally, one additional feature that completes the networking of
public places. This element is perhaps the most critical to public communication
and interaction. Networked places will not only have clouds hovering over them
and cameras watching activity in them. The architectures of public places will be
embedded with digital tags and networked information. Professors Jerry Kang
and Dana Cuff call this already ongoing phenomenon “pervasive computing.”65
Pervasive computing “is what happens when the Internet gets ubiquitous,
embedded, and animated.”66 Professors Kang and Cuff describe the expected
result of this embedding process: “Imagine not a robot, not an isolated and
identifiable device, but a world saturated with networked intelligence.”67
The digitally saturated world will give rise to new communicative forms,
facilitate social networking, and produce a flow of environment-to-person
communication not possible in inert material public places. The devices people
carry with them or wear – personal computers, personal digital assistants, mobile
64

Despite the privacy and other implications of extensive CCTV use, at this point there is very
little transparency in the adoption or use of the technology. Some municipalities have disclosed
the location of their surveillance cameras. But other institutions, including the National Park
Service, have not made this information public. See GAO Report, supra note -- at 16. Few laws
or regulations currently govern public CCTV use. Public participation in its adoption has been
minimal. The Park Service, for example, has never sought public comment on its use of CCTV in
areas of the National Mall. Id. at 4. Few municipalities have developed comprehensive controls
for the use and operation of public surveillance, including protections for private data collected as
a result of surveillance.
65
Jerry Kang & Dana Cuff, Pervasive Computing: Embedding the Public Sphere, 62 WASH. &
LEE L. REV. 93 (2005).
66
Id. at 94.
67
Id. at 95.
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telephones and devices not yet conceived -- will facilitate both person-to-person
and person-to-place communication. Social interaction, including expressive
activity, may change dramatically when, as Kang and Cuff put it, “a digital
nervous system is grafted into the material world.”68
In terms of expressive liberties, perhaps the greatest promise lies in the
power the networked place will have to enhance social networking. As political
scientists and sociologists have noted, contentious displays and social movements
require social capital and coordinated action.69 The internet is already filling
some of the gaps in otherwise frayed social networks.70 Once in public places,
protesters and demonstrators will be able to take advantage of pervasive networks
to create smarter and more spontaneous assemblies. They will be able to use their
personal devices to tactically assemble all at once, in places that are most
effective.
This phenomenon has been referred to as “swarming.”71 Even when it
was limited to technologies of text messaging, swarming proved to be a powerful
weapon of political dissent. During the 1999 World Trade Organization protests
in Seattle, activists relied upon mobile phones and public networking to thwart
some official efforts at repression.72 With public internet access now becoming
widely available, swarming will likely migrate to the Web. Anyone with a
connection will be able to participate, across media, seamlessly.
Smaller assemblies might also form as a result of pervasive and mobile
communications devices. Digitized tags and global positioning satellite (GPS)
intelligence that we carry on our person will notify contacts in our vicinity of our
precise location.73 This could lead to spontaneous gatherings, as people quickly
find one another in real time and real places. Through personal computing
devices, we will also be able to leave digital trails of information to be found by
those who come after us. The networked environment may become a dynamic
digital bulletin board.

68

Id. at 112.
See, e.g., BERT KLANDERMANS, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF PROTEST 15-16 (1997)
(explaining processes of protest formation).
70
See ROBERT PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE (noting the decline in social networks and social
capital).
71
See RHEINGOLD, supra note --, at Chapter 7 (describing public swarming and its effect on
political environments around the globe).
72
See id.
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See Kang & Cuff, supra note – at 104 (“For instance, when you enter the shopping mall, all
friends in your social network who are nearby can be buzzed.”).
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On a more retail or personal level, hand-held devices will enable strangers
to learn bits of information about one another in public places.74 Devices will
“read” one another, allowing for a form of virtual personal reconnaissance.
Bluetooth technologies will allow for “virtual” approaches and communication
with those occupying the same public spaces and using similar devices.75 Right
now, these opportunities are limited to those using similar devices, sharing the
same network. But this phenomenon may someday extend beyond the similarly
networked. One can already imagine a world in which each person has access to
the same pervasive network.
Person-to-environment communication will be a frequent occurrence in
networked public places. People will not merely traverse public places; they will
interact with them.76 The physical environment “will be able to respond directly
to what it senses.”77 As a speaker walks past a certain public place, she may
receive an automated flow of information about conditions, directions, or dangers
in that place.78 She may automatically receive advertisements for products near
that place, based on a geographic reading of her hand-held or worn device.79 The
flow of information will go in two directions. People will be able to communicate
back to the environment, to interact with it.80 Networked public places will
become mobile marketing ecosystems..
Pervasive personal computing will also render each citizen a mobile
recording unit. The cell phones they carry will enable not only photography but
uploading of streaming video. Personal surveillance has already been a useful
tool for protesters, who have used their own record of events to contradict what
has been put forward by police as the “official” record of events on the street. But
there is a larger issue here. Pervasive computing devices will make “on the
scene” reporting by citizens a much more common event. Projects currently
underway will create spaces on the Web that will act as public clearinghouses for
74

See id. at 110 (“PDA-sized gadgets that provide this sort of datasense about fellow conference
attendees have already rolled out.”)
75
Bluetooth technologies facilitate the exchange of information between personal devices like cell
phones and the connectivity of personal computing devices in close proximity to one another. See
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bluetooth.
76
See John Markoff & Martin Fackler, With a Cellphone As My Guide: Digital Search Meets the
Real World In the Streets of Japan, THE NEW YORK TIMES, June 28, 2006 at C1 (describing
phones that combine satellite technology with wireless web as “a missing link between cyberspace
and the physical world”).
77
Kang & Cuff, supra note -- at 94.
78
This will be made possible largely by the proliferation of embedded radio frequency
identification (RFID) tags. See id. at 97-98 (describing RFID technology).
79
See id. at 110 (“As you pass by a commercial center, you receive a visual notice on your
dashboard that your favorite brand of shoes is on sale . . . “).
80
Kang and Cuff raise the possibility that public billboards may actually change content
depending on who happens to be passing by a location. Id. at 112.
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photos, videos and “reporting” sent in by citizens all over the world.81 When we
are in public, we will be watched not only by officials but by an army of “citizenjournalists” too.
The digital nervous system and personal computing appendages attached
to it will alter fundamental features of material public places. The geography will
no longer merely be something we stand or walk upon. We will interact through
and with it. As noted above, the mobility of expression will confound efforts to
spatially regulate it. As public speech becomes more and more digital and virtual,
it will lose its traditional tangible and physical character. Listeners and viewers
will communicate via an additional sense, what Kang and Cuff call a
“datasense.”82 Virtual expression and “datasensing” will be more difficult to
police, in part because it will not be physical and visible.
In addition, the mobile technologies we carry or wear will allow us
constantly to be identified and “authenticated” as we pass through physical
places.83 Public anonymity will be further diluted. The basic choice whether to
speak will no longer be completely our own. It will be automated, in some sense
a product of our consent to carrying or wearing the latest devices as we travel
around in public. As noted, some carrying those devices will be able to “report”
on the acts of others, adding another layer of public surveillance. Finally, in
terms of the traditional equality of material places, only the digitally privileged
will be able to participate fully in networked public places. The digital nervous
system will be possessed only by those who possess the latest technologies. The
new have-nots will not only be missing a critical hardware and computer
connections. They will lack an increasingly critical sense – a “datasense” -- as
well.

III.

Freedom of Expression In Networked Public Places

This Part translates the geography, physicality, anonymity, and equality
concerns raised by the networking of public places into explicit First Amendment
concerns. Most of the commentary, in legal and social science communities, has
centered upon the effect surveillance technologies will have on privacy rights.84
Cameras are only a single feature of a much larger and more sophisticated
81

See Mark Glaser, Stanford Fellow Imagines Every Cell Phone As Citizen Media Outlet, July 18,
2006, available at http://www.pbs.org/mediashift/2006/07/digging_deeperstanford_fellow.html .
A mockup of the site is available at www.InTheFieldOnline.net.
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Id. at 110.
83
Id. at 106.
84
Professors Kang and Cuff do adopt a somewhat broader perspective. As discussed in Part IV,
infra, they examine the implications of pervasive computing for the health of the public sphere
generally. See Kang & Cuff, supra note --, at 115-121. See also Blitz, supra note – at 697-702
(discussing First Amendment anonymity concerns related to public surveillance).
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network, however. The “digital nervous system” is, or at some point will be, an
integrated system. Surveillance cameras will be linked to public Web access.
Mobile data tags will be linked to surveillance technologies. Personal computing
devices will link to the environment, to other devices, to surveillance networks,
and to various information clearinghouses on the Web. The progression to
networked public places will affect a variety of First Amendment principles and
doctrines.
A. Property: The Legal Status of Wireless Clouds
Large-scale municipal wireless projects have been greeted as either the
unremarkable provision of an important public utility or an unnecessary and
unwise interference with traditional private provision of Web access. Mostly
ignored so far have been the serious free speech concerns that arise as
governments step in to provide access to a critical communicative medium like
the internet.
In terms of the provision of communicative infrastructure, Muni WiFi
clouds are unprecedented. How ought we to conceptualize the wireless clouds
hanging over public areas? We might view the provision of public internet access
as analogous to the provision of water, electricity, or other public utilities. In one
sense the analogy has some merit. As they have in other public goods contexts,
governments are stepping in and providing, or partnering with private entities to
provide, a critical public infrastructure. This is what happened with electricity
and sewers. Internet connectivity, one might say, is fast becoming as critical to
the modern citizen as these other services. Governments thus naturally ought to
provide the service of public connectivity.
Ultimately, however, this analogy to public utilities is fundamentally
flawed. For one thing, there is already a flourishing private market for the
provision of internet access. At least in many urban and suburban areas, a
network of hot spots has been developing for some time. With private providers
seemingly in no short supply, one might wonder if there is really some market
failure to correct. As a matter solely of economics, then, there may be sound
reasons for governments to stay out of the internet connectivity market.
But the analogy to other public services suffers from a much deeper flaw
than market economics indicate. Simply put, electricity and sewage are nothing
like the information that will flow as a result of wireless clouds and meshes.
Governmental provision of electricity, for example, raises no serious
constitutional concerns. Assuming the service has not been entirely privatized,
thus removing constitutional concerns, governments must merely refrain from
20
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inequitable provision of services and satisfy basic due process requirements.85
But Muni Wi-Fi is no ordinary public utility in this regard. For the first time,
governments (and in some cases their private partners as state actors) will provide
and control the backbone of a communications network over which vast amounts
of public communications will flow. This invokes an altogether different
analogy. Putting wireless clouds in the sky is like building a public road solely
for communicative purposes. This is much more akin to providing an expressive
forum than a mere public utility.
When governments provide access to information through such forums,
First Amendment issues of access and content control inevitably arise. Wireless
clouds will likely raise similar issues. Suppose, for example, a municipality is not
willing to provide unfettered connectivity. As noted, the Web defies the sort of
spatial control that material places often facilitate. Owing to its architecture,
access to the Web is not partial. How long will it be before concerned citizens or
groups object to public provision of access to pornography, or hateful expression,
or morally offensive materials? How long before suspected terrorists are tracked
through the public network? Or suppose a citizen claims a right of access to the
portal site to convey a message. Does she have a right to post information there?
Although the scope of Muni Wi-Fi projects is unprecedented, this is not
the first time that government has provided internet access in a public place. Nor
is it the first time it has confronted issues relating to internet access control. By
2000, ninety-five percent of public libraries were offering internet access, most
through a federal funding program.86 When public libraries installed their internet
connections, the entire Web flowed into the library space, much as Muni WiFi
will introduce the Web to larger public areas. Reports of adults and children
accessing sexually explicit materials in public libraries, and of patrons exposing
others to this material, quickly began to surface.87 When this situation came to
Congress’s attention, it enacted the Children’s Internet Protection Act, which
required that libraries take steps to prevent access to obscenity, child
pornography, and materials deemed harmful to minors on pain of loss of certain
federal funds.88
The libraries sued, arguing that filtering patron access was an infringement
on patrons’ First Amendment rights and undermined their own mission to provide
85

See, e.g., Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974) (holding that due process
and equal protection claims could not be brought against a private utility).
86
See United States v. American Library Assn., 539 U.S. 194, 199 (2003).
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States v. American Library Assn., 201 F.Supp.2d 401 (E.D. Pa. 2001).
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Children’s Internet Protection Act, 114 Stat. 2763A-355, 20 U.S.C. §§ 9134(f)(1)(A)(i) and
(B)(i); 47 U.S.C. §§ 254 (h)(6)(B)(i) and (C)(i).
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access to the widest possible range of information.89 In United States v. American
Library Association,90 the Supreme Court dismissed these arguments. It noted
that public libraries had always exercised discretion in selecting collection
materials, and that sexually explicit materials have historically not been found on
their shelves.91 Moreover, the Court noted that neither the library’s collection nor
the Web itself is a “forum” for expressive purposes.92 The internet, the Court
noted, was of far too recent vintage to be considered a “quintessential” public
forum like a street or park.93 Moreover, according to the Court libraries do not
provide internet access to encourage the dissemination of a variety of viewpoints;
they do so for the same reasons they provide access to other materials, namely for
education, research, and recreation.94 Thus no speaker could claim a right to use
the library’s internet service to reach a public audience.
What does the library experience suggest about the legal and constitutional
status of governmentally installed wireless clouds? As the Court noted in the
library context, the Web itself cannot be deemed a “traditional” public forum
because this resource is simply too new to have been “immemorially” held in trust
for the use of the public.95 Governmental provision of internet access is yet
another circumstance that highlights the inflexibility of the Court’s rules for
categorizing public places.96 Through Muni WiFi programs, the internet is fast
becoming a resource held “in trust” for public communicative activity. Under
current doctrine, however, the wireless clouds do not create a traditional
expressive forum.
It is more likely that by providing a link to the internet, municipalities are
displaying the requisite intent to establish a “designated” public forum for the
exchange of a diversity of ideas and information.97 Unlike public libraries,
municipalities have not historically exercised editorial discretion in terns of the
content conveyed in public places. Indeed, they are generally forbidden under the
First Amendment from taking the content of expression into account. And unlike
libraries, municipalities are providing the connection to encourage the
89
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dissemination of a variety of viewpoints. Thus, any municipal filtering of public
internet access would have to meet the highest standard of judicial scrutiny.98
Even if a municipality could convincingly argue that it had a compelling
interest to filter, for example to protect children from public exposure to certain
materials deemed harmful to minors, it is doubtful that any sufficiently tailored
means for serving that interest could be fashioned. Filters are certainly far more
technologically advanced today than they were a decade or more ago. But no
filter can currently screen solely illegal content from the Web, leaving the
remainder undisturbed.99 Under the statutes regulating internet access in public
libraries, patrons can simply request that a librarian unblock a website if they
were denied access.100 However workable this sort of system might be in the
limited public space of the library, it cannot be used in vast public areas. Who
would decide whether to unblock a site? On what basis? Pursuant to what
procedures?
Nor will any citizen likely prevail in asserting an access claim to the
public Web portal site. Assuming advertising or other speech does not appear
there, the portal site likely would be deemed a non-public forum. Municipalities
could thus prohibit private expression there. Use of the network will be protected;
use of the portal will not be.
Having created a forum with its wireless clouds, a municipality will have
no choice but to provide the entirety of the Web in public places. The Web
“library” will spill into the public square, just as it flowed into the public libraries.
Exposure to expression that might once have been the province of home-bound
devices has already begun to raise privacy and public captivity concerns. We
shall turn to these next.
B.

Public “Captivity”

The ubiquity of the Web, combined with pervasive and mobile computing
devices, will alter accepted notions of private and public expression. We may
become “captives” to public expression we may not wish to see or hear.
Technologies like mobile phones and other personal devices will thrust speech on
unwilling audiences in public places, on the streets, on buses and subways, and in
parks.
98
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Some of this expression will be sexually explicit. Cell phone providers
are already providing pornographic content in other countries; the U.S. market is
not far behind.101 This will make it possible to view sexually explicit content
virtually anywhere, any time. Several complaints have already arisen when
drivers were subjected to pornographic DVDs playing in nearby cars, which are
clearly visible especially during evening hours.102 As well, new forms of targeted
advertising or spamming that rely upon the GPS features in personal devices will
bombard an already advertising-saturated public.103 Will the First Amendment
permit any reprieve from these potential nuisances?
The First Amendment provides some limited protection for the “captive”
listener or viewer who cannot reasonably avoid unwanted expression. Just as
there are rights to see or hear expression, there are corollary rights not to see or
hear.104 The right to be let alone is most vigorously enforced when the listener or
viewer is in the home, owing to the strength of the privacy interest in that place
and the practical difficulties of avoidance.105 New technologies always pose
distinct problems in terms of their ability to thrust content into places like the
home. In FCC v. Pacifica Foundation,106 for example, the Supreme Court upheld
federal regulations prohibiting the broadcast of “indecent” expression over the
airwaves during certain hours of the day when children and unwilling adults
might be listening. The Court reasoned that radio broadcasts of indecent
expression were akin to an “assault” from which homeowners were entitled to
some protection.107 Similar reasoning was recently invoked by courts to uphold
the federal “Do Not Call Registry,” which prevented most telephone solicitors
from disturbing people while at home.108
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In public places, however, self-help is the primary means of protection
from unwanted expression. The listener or viewer is generally expected to avert
her eyes to public expression she does not care to see or hear. In Cohen v.
California,109 the Court held that viewers in public courthouse corridors could
protect themselves by averting their eyes from Cohen’s offensive jacket, which
was emblazoned with the words “Fuck the Draft.”110 In Erznoznik v. City of
Jacksonville,111 the Court invalidated an ordinance that would have banned all
nudity in outdoor movie theatres.112 The audience, even while driving on the
public highways and thus potentially (and quite dangerously) distracted by the
display, was required to turn a blind eye to what appeared on the screen.113
The networking of public places will challenge fundamental notions of
“public” and “private.” The mobility of private forms of expression will render it
increasingly a matter of public concern. When public places are networked, it
may become increasingly difficult to maintain a basic level of public repose. The
“assaults” may come from many directions at once. Private, offensive expression
will move closer and closer to unwilling or undecided audiences. The nudity on
the outsize public movie screen will appear on the screen in the car sitting in
traffic in front of you. The pornographic magazine will be digitized and
transported onto the subway or bus, or into a public park, airport terminal or other
public place.114
One would expect (or at least hope) that social norms and decorum would
prevent the most intrusive encroachments on others’ public tranquility and repose.
But if some drivers are willing to view sexually explicit material in the car on a
public road or in a parking lot, what will stop them from doing so in other public
places?115 Carrying explicit magazines into public places like buses and parks is
109
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quite different, in social terms, from transporting it by way of personal computing
devices. The latter have already achieved a substantial degree of public
acceptance. They are fast becoming human necessities. They are part of the
public environment.
Right now, the doctrine or principle of captivity offers very little
protection for the unwilling recipient of public expression. But cases like Cohen
and Erznoznik were decided before mobile content devices proliferated in public
places. These decisions were products of a model of public expression based
upon material, not networked, places. That model generally facilitated a spatial
segregation of offensive expression no longer possible in networked public
places. The question is whether the networking of public places counsels a
change in principle when it comes to public captivity.
Although it has been reluctant to grant the unwilling audience broad rights
to be let alone in public, the Court has indicated that the matter requires “delicate
balancing.”116 On the one hand, new technologies will make it easier to thrust
expression into the visual and auditory fields of unwilling audiences, including
children, affecting the tranquility and livability of public places. On the other
hand, we are becoming all too proficient at filtering out the background and
foreground noises of everyday life.
Cases like buses and subway cars remain most problematic, given the
difficulties of escaping unwanted speech and the reliance upon these modes of
transportation by many people. But one might surmise that few today would be
as distressed as Justice Douglas was in Public Utilities Commission v. Pollak117 at
the prospect of radio transmissions being piped onto public buses.118 Douglas, in
dissent, strongly objected to the invasion of public privacy and repose brought
about by these transmissions, in no small part one should note because the
government had something to do with their content.119 Today’s rider may not
even hear such transmissions, so ensconced is she in her own technological
bubble. One might also suspect that our sensibilities, including our expectations
with regard to public repose, have changed dramatically since the 1950s. Justice
Douglas’s outrage was in some sense a product of his times. Modern citizens’
tolerance for the thrusting of expression is likely much higher, by sheer necessity,
than that of generations past.
We have not yet reached a point where freedom of expression must give
way to a generalized right of repose or tranquility. But this may change
116

Erznoznik, 422 U.S. at 208.
343 U.S. 451 (1952).
118
See id. at 468 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
119
See id. at 469 (likening program to a form of mind control).
117

26

THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND NETWORKED PUBLIC PLACES
depending on our experiences in networked public places. The Supreme Court
has, at least in one context, supported the right of listeners to be let alone in public
places.120 There are already laws under consideration that would criminalize the
display of sexually explicit images in cars. Whether the push for new laws to
protect the unwilling listener or viewer will be more widespread is impossible to
know at this point. From a normative perspective, however, it does seem rather
incongruent for the people to simultaneously disappear into personalized bubbles
and at the same time demand legal protection from expression they do not wish to
see or hear.
Sex will not be the only speech thrust upon citizens in networked public
places. The same basic calculus applies to aggressive advertising or what might
be referred to as “public spamming.” Pervasive computing will open up new
possibilities for consumer targeting, including advertisements based upon the
recipient’s present geographical location.
The environment itself will
communicate offers to passersby. Many of these communications will be
unwanted, in the sense that the recipient did not directly solicit them.
Concerns about aggressive or manipulative advertising arise with each
new generation of technologies. In the 1970s, for example, concerns were raised
about Madison Avenue tactics that might be subsumed under the heading
“subliminal advertising.”121 The email spam that stuffs our daily inboxes is only
the latest example of commercial exploitation of new technologies. Public
spamming would merely be the natural “next generation” of this phenomenon.
The differences, however, between previous instances of aggressive
advertising and what may become large-scale public spamming rest both on
notions of place and technological self-help. Private spamming and harassing
advertising are particularly troublesome because they invade the home. As noted,
however, we enter the public sphere with a very limited expectation of privacy.
In public places, we are already bombarded with commercial advertisements. As
distasteful as some of these pleas are, as long as they are not false and misleading
they are protected expression.122 Although their time, place, and manner of
delivery can be regulated if sufficiently important reasons warrant, they cannot be
prohibited. Just as we daily exercise selective attention and memory to deal with
120
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those ads, so too will we have to learn to ignore digitally delivered ads while we
are in public places.
This assumes, of course, that the advertisements ever reach us. If we do
not wish to receive them, we will presumably find a way to program our personal
devices to filter them out.123 Or we will walk away from the place that is
facilitating the transmission. Or, if one can imagine such a thing, we will simply
turn the device off. Increasingly the power of avoidance will lie precisely where
the power of delivery does – in the technology we hold in our hands or wear on
our bodies.
The networking of public places will bring vast amounts of previously
“private” expressive content into public view. Barring some rather serious
doctrinal reconsideration, which at this point seems unlikely and probably in any
event unnecessary, we will likely have to tolerate more offensive and aggressive
forms of public expression in networked public places. Self-help, in terms of both
social practices and technological solutions, will be the primary recourse when
unwanted expression intrudes on the privacy and repose of unwilling audiences.
C.

Protection: Dangerous, Offensive, and Harmful Speech Activity

Public captivity raises an even larger concern with respect to the presence
of harmful or dangerous speech in networked public places. As noted in Part II,
in material public places expression – and its regulation -- tends to be tangible
and physical. Assuming some minimal advance notice, a listener or viewer can
generally avoid speech by avoiding the speaker, or the place. The tangibility and
visibility of expression in material places also facilitates its official regulation.
Doctrines like true threats, fighting words, harassment, and incitement are based
on a material model of public places and public expression. Expression in
networked public places is already beginning to lose its tangible and physical
characteristics. What protection will there be for audiences, and the public at
large, from harmful expression in networked public places that is digitally
conveyed?
New technologies invariably give rise to new forms of annoying and
harassing expressive behavior. There may in fact turn out to be a number of
annoying and embarrassing applications of new technologies in networked public
places. For example, there have been public voyeurism issues related to recent
uses of personal cameras in public places.124 Today it is relatively easy to take a
123
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photograph of a person in public, perhaps doctor the image in any number of
ways, and post it immediately on a Web site for all to see. Soon a single device
like a cell phone will serve all of these purposes at once.
More seriously, in networked public places it may soon be possible to
approach a recipient virtually, perhaps anonymously. Devices will “introduce”
themselves to other nearby devices.125 Along with public spamming we may see
new forms of harmful speech. We may encounter an updated “virtual” version of
the sidewalk harassment that occurs with disturbing frequency in material public
places.126 The public audience may also be vulnerable to an even more pernicious
form of harassment that we might call “public cyber-stalking.”127 This is not,
admittedly, a current problem in part owing to Americans’ relative slowness in
adopting new peer-to-peer technologies.128 But consider that a mere decade ago,
few had even heard of “cyber-stalking.” As a result of some pervasive online
misconduct, today many states have laws that purport to protect unwilling
recipients from harassing, annoying, and even embarrassing online
communications.129 What, if any, protection can or should the law provide from
new forms of harmful expression produced by and in networked public places?130
There are obvious constitutional problems with protecting any of us from
merely “annoying” or “embarrassing” expression, as some cyber-stalking laws
purport to do.131 The networked public environment will often be an annoying
125
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place to be. Opportunities for public embarrassment will rise as cameras capture
public events. But assuming the communication is delivered through an online
medium, with the requisite intent and the effect of causing a reasonable fear of
harm, existing statutes would appear to provide at least one possible means of
redress for the victim of public cyber-stalking. There is no reason to limit
application of these statutes to instances in which the victim is in the home or
workplace when she receives the communications. The harm is the psychological
damage the fear engenders, and that fear may be even greater in an open public
place where the victim may be more physically exposed and vulnerable. So long
as the victim knows or reasonably fears she is being stalked, the statutes should
apply.132
The concerns with public cyber-stalking are not ultimately legal but
pragmatic ones. Even with ubiquitous CCTV and other forms of surveillance, the
likelihood of real-time official intervention is quite slim. Technological advances
are also making proof of these offenses increasingly difficult. A sustained stream
of communication to one’s home or work computer may produce a record of
evidence sufficient to identify, arrest, and prosecute a wrongdoer. But a quickly
delivered and perhaps encrypted strike in a public place, or even a series of them,
will be difficult to trace, track, and police. Now add one more twist to our public
cyber-stalking scenario. It is currently possible to send “self-destructing” virtual
communications -- messages that explode and essentially disappear shortly after
they are received.133 Under these circumstances, proof and prosecution under
threat or other safety laws will be most difficult if not altogether impossible.
It would seem that, as in material places, the merely annoying and
embarrassing will either have to be tolerated or policed by social norms and selfhelp mechanisms. The recipient or target of harassing expression in networked
public places will have at her disposal substantial means of self-help. She might
of course leave the park, mall, or other place. But as occurs in some real-space
harassment and stalking, she may be followed. Or she may reset her device’s
receipt protocols to block any further messages from the particular speaker. This
may be the best defense against at least some forms of public cyber-harassment.
We should not, however, overlook the potential costs associated with this
particular form of self-help. Taking the most extreme defensive stance, for
example, each person could effectively create a “white list” of persons from
which they will accept messages in any public place. This would protect the
listener from unwanted messages, but only by effectively isolating her from
public communications she might have actually desired to receive.
132
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It would thus seem that as in the case of public captivity audiences will
mostly have to resort to self-help and other private means of avoidance when
confronted with harassing expression in networked public places. According to
some recent studies, this is apparently as Americans would prefer things. Survey
results indicate that in many cases the public seems to prefer that norms rather
than laws be used to regulate problematic expression.134 One would expect that if
given the option, these respondents might also prefer technological solutions to
legal ones.
Virtual harassment and cyber-stalking are only two forms of harmful
speech that may occur in networked public places. The examples demonstrate the
common difficulty with protecting any of us from digitally conveyed expression
in public places. Other dangerous or harmful expression, including “true threats”
and “fighting words,” raise similar issues of pragmatics and proof.135 Virtual
threats and fighting words are not generally going to be witnessed events, in the
sense that no material manifestation of them will occur and no public audience
will experience them.
Moreover, these doctrines were developed with the imminence of real
space and time in mind. Can one reasonably fear a threat delivered in a text
message, with no further action taken? Can one invite a brawl through a text
message?136 Ultimately, as was true when stalking went online, it may be
necessary to rethink or perhaps redefine the elements of these content categories
to fit the new circumstances of networked public places. Or, alternatively, the
networking of public places may provide further evidence that these categories
are unworkable in a modern world in which the forms and mechanisms of
communication are rapidly changing.
Nowhere are the effects of networking on space and time likely to be more
felt than with regard to the content category “incitement to unlawful action.” To
constitute incitement, a communication must be “directed to inciting or producing
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imminent lawless action and [] likely to incite or produce such action.”137 What
exactly does “imminence” indicate in networked public places?
The incitement doctrine, like many others, developed under conditions in
which speakers and audiences were located in the same place. Wireless
networking and pervasive computing erase spatial boundaries; these features can
bring people together with remarkable speed and efficiency. As noted in Part II,
mobile computing devices have the potential to facilitate assembly and collective
action. The dark side of this, of course, is the power these devices have to
facilitate collective acts of terrorism.138
On the one hand, most internet communications would seem to fail the
imminence test. Internet communications can certainly lead to punishment for
threatening speech, at least where tangible physical harm actually occurs in
material places.139 But in terms of incitement in particular, the nature of internet
communications is such that words on the Web are not generally delivered
instantaneously to the audience.140 Here, however, is one place where the
intersection of material and cyber-places may matter. The requisite imminence
and risk of action may not have been present where a potential lawbreaker, sitting
at his desktop in a pre-networked environment, posted a message on a Web site
encouraging the like-minded to “move on City Hall.” But imminence and
likelihood of harm may need to be calculated differently in a networked public
environment. The networked speaker may be communicating from afar, while the
threat on the ground from “swarming” and other coordinated activities may be
both real and imminent. With always-on public Web access, co-actors would
have instantaneous access to the speaker’s instructions and encouragements.
Their mobility and access to shared information networks would significantly
raise the risk of collective action.
The line between “incitement” and mere encouragement has always been
somewhat hazy. Recent terrorism prosecutions appear to be pushing the limits of
the imminence requirement under Brandenburg’s classic articulation of
incitement doctrine. Suspects are being arrested prior to taking any substantial
action toward perpetrating a crime, sometimes for little more than discussing their
137
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hatred for the United States or the possibility of some future attack.141 New types
of criminal activity like terrorism, coupled with new technologies like wireless
networks and personal computing devices, need not necessarily change the
definition of “incitement.” But they may well affect the delicate balance the
doctrine requires officials and courts to maintain. The qualities of space and time,
which help separate “preemptive” and illegitimate acts and sanctions from lawful
ones, will be less and less reliable indicators in networked places. Plausible
arguments for stretching the scope of the “imminence” standard will arise as
public places become networked.
The imminent melding of cyberspaces and material spaces will raise
fundamental questions about doctrines developed to police expression that has up
until now been mostly material, physical, and visible. Personally harassing and
offensive expression will likely have to be dealt with through self-help
mechanisms. Larger public safety threats may involve a reconsideration of
concepts such as imminence and preemption. To police incitements and threats
that cannot be seen or heard will require ever more sophisticated surveillance
capabilities and activities. As discussed below, this surveillance will raise
substantial First Amendment concerns of its own.
D.

Protest: Assembly, Association, and Anticipatory Conformity

Pervasive surveillance will make it possible for authorities to know of
matters in advance, and thus to act preemptively. The technologies of
surveillance are not only proliferating but becoming more and more powerful in
terms of their capabilities. As a result we may no longer assume that we are
blending into a public environment. Our activities, our associations, perhaps
someday even our public thoughts may be discovered.142
Public surveillance raises Fourth Amendment privacy concerns.143 But
there are serious First Amendment considerations as well. Depdnding on its
ultimate form and scope, public surveillance may have substantial adverse effects
on public expressive liberties. In terms of public expressive displays like protests
and demonstrations, two general burdens will likely be imposed. First, there may
be a chilling of associative rights. If assemblies are routinely watched and their
activities recorded, it may be that speakers will be less likely to join in certain
141
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public causes. Second, there may be a chilling of expressive behavior.
Sociologists, philosophers, and legal theorists have examined the phenomenon of
“anticipatory conformity,” in which actors engage in self-restraining behavior
when they believe they are being watched.144 Given the nature of their expressive
repertoires, political activists and other dissenters may disproportionately
experience these effects.
Some have suggested that the mere existence of public surveillance
cameras may violate the First Amendment.145 Under current doctrine, however,
there are severe obstacles to such a claim. The most significant obstacle to a First
Amendment claim based on the mere existence of public surveillance is Laird v.
Tatum.146 In Tatum, the Court held that a challenge to an Army covert
surveillance program that tracked the activities of certain civil rights protest
groups raised a non-justiciable controversy.147 The surveillance program’s
existence was not in dispute. But none of the alleged victims could demonstrate
that they had suffered any cognizable injury as a result of being watched. The
Court acknowledged that a First Amendment violation might arise from
something short of a direct prohibition on the exercise of First Amendment
rights.148 But the “chilling” effect it had recognized in prior cases, the Court said,
involved exercises of governmental power that were “regulatory, proscriptive, or
compulsory in nature, and the complainant was either presently or prospectively
subject to the regulations, proscriptions, or compulsions he was challenging.”149
Tatum suggests that any broadside by political groups or activists against
general public surveillance programs is likely to fail.150 In Tatum authorities were
attending public meetings and gathering information from news accounts.151
Only the means of collecting information has changed. As in Tatum, only public
information is being collected under known official surveillance programs. Of
course, more serious concerns might be raised if specific groups or individuals
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were somehow targeted for public surveillance without sufficient cause.152 The
result might also be different if authorities were some day to link features of the
network, for example to access private Web or other electronic information about
persons or groups who are gathering in public.
The mere existence of surveillance cameras situated in public places,
however, would not seem to surpass Tatum’s jurisdictional hurdle, much less
demonstrate a First Amendment violation. This will likely remain the case so
long as courts continue to view the harm or injury from pervasive surveillance as
minimal and, what is more important, non-regulatory.
It is not difficult to imagine that pervasive surveillance at places like the
National Mall may have serious chilling effects on public protest activity, both in
terms of limiting associations and encouraging the “anticipatory conformity” of
public expressive behavior. The same effect might be imagined in public squares
and parks across the country. But imaginings are not concrete harms. What is
required -- if plaintiffs are to remain in court, and to have a chance of success -- is
a much stronger scientific showing that such effects actually exist.153
As the technologies of surveillance become more sophisticated, research
on their expressive effects must keep pace. There is already a body of research
examining the societal effects of pervasive surveillance.154 Many criminologists,
urban geographers, and sociologists have concluded that public surveillance (a)
does not serve to reduce crime, (b) excludes certain populations from public areas,
and (c) reduces tolerance for “difference,” including unconventional (but not
illegal) behavior.155 These findings and conclusions raise substantial First
Amendment concerns. At this point, however, there is insufficient research to
convincingly demonstrate that constant surveillance amounts to a form of
“regulatory” harm. It must be shown that the networked environment actually
prevents or substantially discourages speakers and assemblies from engaging in
public expressive activities.
Even with such a showing, however, the
government’s response will be that the threat of terrorism is a compelling reason
to put public areas under surveillance. That concern has already caused courts to
loosen restrictions on political surveillance.156
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There is little doubt that pervasive public surveillance will affect the
exercise of public liberties. The present challenge is to demonstrate these effects
concretely, in a manner that satisfies Tatum. We have a sociological expectation
of blending in avoiding constant scrutiny while in public places. Right now,
however, we have no enforceable legal or constitutional right of this sort.
E. Privacy: Identity, Thought, and Compulsory Speech
Political activists and protesters will have a difficult time convincing
courts of their right to avoid public scrutiny. What about the public solicitor,
pamphleteer, or solitary speaker? A speaker’s right to communicate anonymously
in public may be compromised by identity-exposing surveillance. Networkfacilitated intrusions may someday make it possible for authorities to know a
person’s thoughts, for example by knowing what Web sites she has visited while
in public areas or even, as technology becomes more sophisticated, “reading” the
face. Digitized environments may compel speakers to announce their identities
and other information. Do any of these things violate the First Amendment?
Protection of one’s identity is an aspect of the First Amendment’s privacy
guarantee. Recall that in McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n157, the Supreme
Court held that there was at least a limited right to communicate anonymously.158
Given the power of today’s surveillance technologies, it is certainly conceivable
that in the future the right to anonymous pamphleteering could be violated in
several ways. Cameras might reveal personal, identifying information from
distances of hundreds of feet.159 As it develops, facial recognition technology
may also reveal one’s identity to authorities. In a future public environment, a
speaker may be forced somehow to “authenticate” himself – by digital tags on his
person or objects -- before being permitted to enter a particular public place.
All of these things would disclose a person’s identity to authorities, at
times while she is engaged in protected speech. But McIntyre would only seem to
protect identity in the hypothetical case of the exposed pamphleteer. The decision
does not protect any generalized right of speakers to disguise or conceal their
identities while in public.160 Rather, it protects the right to publish one’s views
restrictions on surveillance); Alliance to End Repression v. City of Chicago, 237 F.3d 799 (7th Cir.
2001 (same).
157
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158
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160
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anonymously.161 Identity is protected, in other words, not for its own sake but in
connection with the act of publishing some message or view of the author. The
author wishes to publish those views in such a manner that viewers remain
unaware of her identity, whether for fear of reprisals or for expressive effect.162
So long as governments do not regulate identity by prohibiting
dissemination of non-anonymous messages, McIntyre would appear to provide no
relief to those whose identity is merely exposed as a result of public surveillance.
This does not mean that the loss of anonymity will have no effect on public
expression and public life more generally. At this point in time, however, First
Amendment conceptions of privacy do not encompass a general right to conceal
one’s identity while in public places.
More disturbingly, the networking of public places may also someday
make it possible for authorities to intrude on the private thoughts of citizens. The
First Amendment protects a private realm of thought, including what books we
read, what Web sites we choose to visit, and what beliefs we hold.163 Certain
networking features will implicate this aspect of expressive privacy.
Municipal involvement in the operation of public WiFi systems may
endanger this aspect of First Amendment privacy. Again, the experience of
public libraries that provide Web access may provide some insight. Librarians
have been vigorously resisting official requests made under the PATRIOT Act for
patron library records.164 The librarians have been defending the rights of their
patrons’ liberty to access information without fear of governmental surveillance
of their reading habits. They seek to protect patrons’ First Amendment rights to
free inquiry and thought.
The libraries are well positioned, institutionally and as a matter of their
basic mission, to resist such requests. Suppose, however, that a municipality
providing or partnering with an Internet Service Provider to provide public WiFi
receives credible information concerning a terrorist organization or an individual
161
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believed to be implicated in a terrorist plot. If the municipality is the sole
provider of wireless internet access, what will prevent it from monitoring or
accessing the records of that organization or person? If it is providing access in
partnership with a private service provider, will the provider feel pressured to turn
over such information -- in some cases without a subpoena? If the Web
constitutes a “library” of information, records of what one is searching ought to be
protected regardless of the place in which the search occurs – in the home, in a
library, or on a public bench.
A more literal interference with private thoughts may occur in fully
networked public places. The First Amendment does not permit governments to
punish anyone for merely thinking bad thoughts.165 Next generation facial
recognition programs may offer a window into a person’s private thoughts. Facial
recognition software, which has been used at major sporting and other public
events, maps the details and ratios of facial geometry using certain algorithms.
The most prevalent of these is the “eigenface,” which is composed of
“eigenvalues.”166 The current technology has substantial error rates.167 But future
generations of this technology will no doubt be more accurate in identifying
individuals and reading their faces.
Suppose the technology existed to permit officials to canvass a crowd,
focus on a specific person identified as a potential threat of whatever nature, and
calculate his eigenvalues. To make the matter more concrete, suppose a paroled
child predator appears at a public park where several children are playing.168
Suppose further that the predator has done nothing in terms of approaching the
children or otherwise acting on whatever impulses he may have. But his
eigenvalues, captured on a public surveillance camera, reveal that he is so
inclined.169
Is there a basis for preemptively arresting the predator if these measures
strongly indicate some fantasy or other invidious proclivity toward the children in
165
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the park?170 Under current doctrine the answer to this last question would appear
to be “no.” The predator may be arrested for the acts he commits while in a
public place, but not for what he merely happens to be thinking while there. Until
now this matter has not been one of serious concern. Governments, after all,
cannot read citizens’ minds. But as one commentator has noted: “Current
research blurs the line between biometrics and mind reading.”171 Like our
identities, our thoughts may be exposed in future networked environments.
Technology will make thoughts more and more accessible to authorities.
Finally, speakers in networked public places may often be compelled to
speak in the sense of identifying and authenticating themselves. Suppose, for
example, that as a condition of access to some public place the government
requires that a machine must read a compulsory identification card. The First
Amendment protects the right not to be compelled to express thoughts and beliefs
against one’s will.172 The hypothetical compulsion here does not, however,
compel the stating of any belief, creed, or thought. It is more akin to the sending
of an administrative email, an act the Supreme Court recently found not to
implicate the First Amendment’s ban on compelled speech.173 Such a system
would be more akin to regulating conduct – in this case entry – than speech,
thought, or belief.
The networking of public places will strain currently recognized rights to
maintain speaker anonymity. It will facilitate the surveillance of records
indicating private interests and preferences. It may ultimately expose the thoughts
of public citizens. And it will compel authentication, perhaps constantly. Again,
much will depend on how the technology develops and is used. The most that can
be said at this point in time is that there are serious First Amendment privacy
concerns lurking in the features of networked public places. Whether any of them
will ripen into constitutional violations will ultimately depend on their
sophistication and uses.
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F. Press: “Citizen-Journalists” and Disclosures of Private Information
The networking pf public places will also affect the reporting of news and
the flow of information. These things are of course critical to core First
Amendment values like self-government and the search for truth.
In the traditional model, news was gathered and disseminated by major
news media outlets. Reporters at news desks and on the beat delivered
information to a mostly passive public audience. Today, however, citizens have
become increasingly involved in news-gathering and publishing. The internet, of
course, is the primary force behind this change. Weblogs at first supplemented
and now appear to be displacing the traditional press as sources of information.
The networking of public places will continue this trend. It will fill streets, parks,
squares, and other public places with citizen-journalists. Citizen-reporters will be
able to easily deliver the “live and on the scene” portion of the news bloggers
miss while at their desks. They will be able to go out in the “field,” interview
witnesses to events, and publish “reports” to an already growing number of Web
clearinghouses.174
This trend raises two important First Amendment issues. The first issue
involves the very definition of “the press.” There is at this moment a serious
debate regarding whether those who contribute and post to Weblogs and qualify
as “press” under the First Amendment. That question has some important
pragmatic implications. For example, if they are members of the press, bloggers
would presumably be entitled to whatever privilege for withholding confidential
sources the “mainstream” press possesses.175 In broader terms, although the press
has few special privileges under the First Amendment its status presents special
considerations with regard to such things as prior restraints and the application of
general laws to press interests.176 If nothing else, the mantle of “the press” may
cause courts to more carefully scrutinize limits on information gathering and
publishing.
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The Weblog now performs many of the same functions as major news
media outlets in terms of informing the public, exposing governmental corruption,
and providing public access to information on a broad array of issues of public
concern.177 Whether by serving these functions bloggers are entitled to
constitutional protection for sources or other press privileges is an interesting
question.178 If they are, then one must ask whether “the press” continues to
convey anything truly meaningful in constitutional terms. After all, as one
commentator has said: “When everyone can be a member, the club can no longer
promise special treatment.”179
The networking of public places will contribute to the blurring of the line
between members of the public and members of “the press.” Sophisticated means
of information gathering and publishing will be available to more and more
citizens. Like bloggers, on-the-ground citizen-journalists will likely claim First
Amendment privileges and protections. In United States v. Wolf,180 a freelance
journalist has been jailed for refusing to turn over to a grand jury footage of a
political protest in which anarchists are suspected of vandalizing a police car.
Thus far the court has refused to recognize any journalist’s privilege for
withholding the video footage.181
Courts will increasingly be called upon in cases like this to determine not
only the scope of constitutional privileges but the classes of persons entitled to
claim them. If “the press” is to retain any constitutional meaning at all, then not
every citizen armed with a recording device and an internet connection can be
considered a member of this club. Among other things, the extent to which
extending privileges and other protections to millions of citizen-journalists would
undermine law enforcement interests surely counsels against expanding the
definition so far. And the ordinary citizen is not likely to be cultivating sources to
facilitate the flow of sensitive information. She is much more likely to be
recording events as they occur on the ground. She will be subject to no editorial
oversight or professional standards.182 She will be primarily observing, with the
177
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additional and often merely incidental capabilities of recording and publishing.
She will, in short, remain more citizen than journalist.
The second First Amendment issue relates to what all of these citizenjournalists shall be permitted to report about. Some of what transpires in public
places consists of private facts and moments. As discussed earlier, we expect at
least some of the time to blend into public places. If we cannot, this may affect
public expressive activities. The question here is whether there are any limits on
fellow citizens’ efforts to report and publish private facts in public settings.
The Supreme Court has been highly protective of the right to publish
information, so long as it is lawfully obtained and of some interest to the public.
In Florida Star v. B.J.F.,183 the Court held that a newspaper could not be punished
under state law for truthfully publishing the name of a rape victim it had obtained
lawfully. Even this very personal fact was considered “newsworthy.”184
The constitutional standard announced in Florida Star is in conflict with
the privacy tort known as “publicity given to private life.”185 Indeed, as Justice
White stated in his dissent in Florida Star, the decision effectively “obliterated”
the tort.186 The standard of public significance or “newsworthiness” ultimately
protects very little of our private lives from public disclosure. That standard is
designed to permit the broadest gathering and dissemination of information. This
is a salutary thing, of course, in terms of First Amendment values. Indeed, some
have suggested that the public disclosure privacy tort is wholly at odds with these
basic values.187 If the tort is interpreted too broadly, it will likely chill speech and
thus interfere with the flow of information to the public.
When everyone becomes a gatherer and disseminator of news, however,
then everything becomes to some degree a matter of public significance. The
networking of public places, which will be filled with citizen-journalists, will
make us all increasingly “newsworthy” subjects. If the tort of public disclosure
of private facts was not already dead, the networking of public places will surely
contribute to its passing.188 Citizen-journalists, like traditional reporters, will
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have few limits with regard to what is within their legitimate domain of reportage.
This may further discourage, among other things, public expressive activity.189
We may well wish to have some legal recourse in networked places
crawling with camera-toting citizen-journalists. We certainly must expect to be
observed in public. But that does not mean we expect that our every move will be
recorded by citizen-journalists.190 The threat of tort liability might preserve at
least some measure of private, anonymous life in public places.191 To this end,
Professor Andrew McClurg has suggested that the privacy torts be expanded to
include some right to “public privacy.”192 He argues that a tort action is needed
for what he calls “public intrusions.” 193 As support for the recognition of this
tort, he cites two factors, namely an increasingly aggressive media and advances
in video and other technologies of surveillance and recording.194
Although the matter is quite close, the First Amendment balance seems
best struck in favor of recognizing such a tort. There must of course be protection
for citizen-journalists’ gathering and dissemination of matters of legitimate public
interest.195 As noted earlier, protesters who videotape public events can
effectively challenge “official” accounts of these events. But when the matter
recorded and published is one of wholly private interest – who one embraces, or
meets with, or what books or magazines one reads, for example – then there
should be some protection against intrusion even if the activity occurs in public.
Taking the larger First Amendment view, such protection will help to ensure that
there is continued presence in and use of public places. There are already many
factors that work against this presence and use, including pervasive official
surveillance programs. Citizen-journalists should not be permitted to contribute
to these constraints by indiscriminately recording and publishing private moments
in public places without consequence.
The First Amendment effects produced by the networking of public places
will be both wide and deep. Even the ongoing controversy over who constitutes
“the press” will to some degree be affected. Pervasive computing and always189
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available Web access will turn everyone into a potential citizen-journalist capable
of filing reports “from the field.” We ought to ensure that when all of this taping
and recording captures private moments and events, there will be some recourse
in tort law. The First Amendment interests in continued use of public places
outweigh the right of the citizen-journalists to “report” news that is of no
legitimate public interest.

IV.

Networked Public Places and Democratic Values

It is important to consider the effect networked places may have on
individual and collective First Amendment rights. But there are much larger
issues lurking in the steady progression toward networked public places. As
Professor Julie Cohen has recently reminded us, cyberspace and other
technologies do not exist or operate in a spatial vacuum. These things affect the
lived, embodied spaces of real people.196 Professor Cohen is surely correct that
“[c]yberspace is part of lived space[.]”197 As the foregoing discussion shows, this
is now quite literally true. Clouds, cameras, and computers are altering the public
expressive environment. They are affecting how we interact, who we interact
with, and what information is at hand as we live and experience public places.
We must ask, then, what sort of lived spaces networked places will
ultimately be.198 We must examine the impact spatial networking may have on
the ability of public places to serve critical First Amendment values relating to
self-government. To do this effectively we must consult the work of geographers
and sociologists as well as constitutional scholars. Networking will bring
fundamental changes to urban and suburban landscapes. It will affect how we
live and experience public places. Although it is too infrequently acknowledged,
what these other disciplines have to say about public places is central to the
constitutional considerations at hand.
A. Public Places and the Public Sphere
An initial point of clarification is necessary. In determining what effect
networking will have on public expressive life, we must concretize matters by
clarifying the relevant places under consideration. “Public places” is obviously a
large geographic canvas. This Article has been concerned with public expressive
places in the broadest sense, from sidewalks to malls to street corners. These
196
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places make up what I have elsewhere referred to as an “expressive topography” - the public space potentially available for expressive activities.199 These places
are all to one degree or another becoming networked places.
My use of “public place” is narrower than the concept of the “public
sphere.”200 As noted earlier, Professors Kang and Cuff have analyzed the effect
of one particular aspect of the networked environment -- pervasive computing -on the public sphere.
As they conceive it, this sphere “connotes the
comprehensive intermingling of spatial and social terrains.”201 The public sphere,
they say, is an open space of interaction and exchange, a shared space separate
from the “intimate, protected, and familiar” private sphere.202 This sphere is
much broader than “public places.” Indeed Kang and Cuff note that the public
sphere extends to such places as movie theatres, laundromats, even traffic jams.203
To analyze the effects of pervasive computing on the public sphere,
Professors Kang and Cuff chose as their paradigmatic spatial example the
shopping mall, a place that illustratively and effectively combines elements of
community and commerce.204 They appear to have chosen the mall for two
general reasons. First, they note that “in many urban environments, malls are
arguably what our public spaces have become.”205 This is unfortunately true,
insofar as public places now facilitate commerce more than any other form of
interaction. Second, the mall was chosen as a paradigm because it is a place
where people can generally be found. As Kang and Cuff say, they wish to be
“practical,” to “look at the spaces where people actually are, not where academics
long for them to be.”206
The focus on the public sphere generally, and the mall in particular, is too
broad and too narrow respectively. It is too broad if one is asking, as this Article
does, what effect spatial networking will have on expressive values. Many of the
places in the public sphere, including laundromats and traffic jams, have no
connection at all to such values. In fact, malls as a class of property are not
presently considered expressive forums.207 The shopping mall in particular is an
199
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example of what I have elsewhere called, borrowing a term from geographers, an
expressive “non-place” -- a space where expressive culture is discouraged or
prevented from developing.208 To be sure, as Kang and Cuff note, urban social
critics have long lamented the “malling” of public place.209 But to an extent this
begs the question: What functions ought our public places to serve? As well,
whether or not academics wish it so, people in fact do remain on the streets, in the
parks, and in public squares. They continue to rely on these places, and others, to
exercise public expressive liberties. We ought to ask how we might make space
for expressive activity in such places.
The paradigm we should adopt in order to address specifically expressive
values is not a mall, but something more akin to the (National) Mall.210 For
purposes of the discussion that follows, let us take as our paradigm place not the
shopping mall but the local public park or public square. These are the sorts of
places that are most critical in terms of engendering civic republicanism and a
sense of democratic community.211
What speech activity will occur or be possible in these places once they
become networked? Who will actively participate, and by what means? How
democratic and facilitative of self-government will networked public places
actually be? What steps might be taken to ensure that public expressive values
will endure in the public places of the future? To answer these questions we must
first have a better sense of the expressive functions public places ideally might
serve.212
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B.

The Democratic Functions of Public Places

Public places substantially influence the nature and character of public
citizenship.213 Their architectures (material and otherwise), the degree of freedom
of access to them, and the nature of public interaction within them, mark the
boundaries of our public liberties. To the extent that our public places are open
and vibrant, they have the capacity to facilitate citizens’ claims to identity, create
breathing space for democratic participation and self-governance, and lend
transparency to public expression and democratic governance. To the extent that
use of such places is discouraged by spatial networking, these critical democratic
functions are diminished. To be quite clear, what follows is very much a
description of an ideal state of affairs. I do not contend that parks, squares, and
other expressive places currently serve the highlighted functions, or at least that
they serve them very well. But we should not build a networked environment that
undermines these functions.
1.

Place and Identity

Democratic citizenship involves living among others in a polity.
Regardless of how often we may retreat to private enclaves, citizenship still
requires some degree of public presence. As geographers have noted, the
presence of an individual or group in public places is itself a claim to
acceptance.214 It is important that all have an equal opportunity to actively
participate in public expressive activities in public places.
Material public places, as noted in Part II, serve a leveling or equalizing
function in this regard. The causes of “little people” find voice there. The recent
nationwide immigrant protests made a quintessential identity claim in this
fashion.215 By assembling in the streets and expressing themselves there,
immigrants expressed a clear message: “We are here, and we are not going
anywhere.” Their demonstrations and other activities sparked a national
conversation about the nation’s immigration policies.216 The situation bears some
resemblance to the identity claims civil rights protesters made in the 1960s when
they took to the streets, occupied public buildings, and staged sit-ins. They too
213
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were arguing for inclusion in a democratic community. Their very presence
symbolized their right to exist, to be counted as members of the polity.
If access to public places indicates acceptance, exclusion or substantial
displacement conveys denial of one’s public identity. This is sometimes a matter
of social justice, as when the poor and homeless are ejected from substantial
urban areas or harassed through aggressive enforcement of vagrancy laws.217
Class biases unfortunately persist in today’s public square. Officials can be overzealous in their efforts to preserve public norms of order and tranquility. For
example, a federal appeals court recently invalidated a Los Angeles law
permitting the arrest and conviction of the homeless for merely being – standing,
sitting, or sleeping – in certain public places.218 The court held, in essence, that
authorities cannot simply ban the public existence of an entire class of people.
Public places are symbolic of equality, acceptance, and political
community. They are open to all on an equal basis, regardless of social or
economic class. To exclude someone, either directly or indirectly, from
participation in public life is a derogation of a fundamental claim to public
identity. Many forces negatively affect public claims of civic identity. Among
these are the increasing trend toward privatization of public places, gender- and
race-based public harassment, and a variety of legal regulations of the places
where expression may occur.219 We must ask what further impact the networking
of public places might have on public presence, participation, and identity claims.
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2. Place and Self-Governance
In addition to facilitating identity claims, public places serve fundamental
self-governance functions.220 They provide critical breathing room in which
speakers can approach, speak to, and attempt to persuade audiences.221 In the
material marketplace conversations with other public citizens take place, petitions
are signed, leaflets and pamphlets are distributed, signs are carried and posted,
parades and protests are staged. The people practice self-governance in public
places.
Consider a place like the National Mall. The Mall is a deeply inscribed
public place; one might say sacred ground insofar as self-governance is
concerned. The condition of this place matters deeply in terms of shared national
First Amendment values. Traditionally, speakers and audiences gathered in this
and other public places with some confidence that authorities were not tracking
their every movement and utterance. This created open space for protest and
dissent. But in a broader sense it created stages for democratic participation of all
sorts. Public places have traditionally been part of a democratic commons, not
militarized grids under constant surveillance by public and private devices.
It is not merely the character of these places but the manner in which
people are able to interact there that determines the scope of self-governance.
Self-governance requires, fundamentally, that listeners hear and audiences see
speakers as they attempt to convey messages. One of the principal advantages of
physically emplaced expression, as opposed to the many burgeoning forms of
virtual communication, is its ability to jar an audience, to force it to heed the
messenger (if not the message). Jehovah’s Witnesses, labor activists, anti-war
protesters, suffragists, feminists, and civil rights proponents have all relied on the
220
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tangibility and physicality of public places and public expression to further their
causes. They have understood, as many still do, that effective speech sometimes
entails interfering with the settled expectations of the unwilling or undecided
public audience. Public places cannot serve fundamental participatory functions
unless these conditions can regularly be met.
In addition, then, to facilitating identity claims public places are pragmatic
proving grounds for public speakers and audiences. They are, or at least have
been, spaces for public interaction. Whether or not speakers have persuaded
listeners, public places have provided them the opportunity to do so. Public selfgovernance depends upon the continued existence of such opportunities.
3. Place and Transparency
As noted in Part II, one of the defining characteristics of expression in
material public places is its visibility and transparency. Public places serve two
critical transparency functions. These assist speakers in making identity claims
and facilitate public participation and self-governance.
First, because it takes place in the open material public expression can be
seen and heard by others occupying the same places. Unlike, say, lobbying and
other forms of private attempts at political persuasion, public expression is part of
a public record. The public audience can witness the speech of marginal groups.
It can come to know and recognize a cause. The public can assess the look and
feel of speakers. How disgruntled or angry is this group? Does it represent a
potential threat to safety? Do I want to support its cause? For the speaker, public
displays can attract media attention and public sympathy, expand participation in
a movement or cause, and signal support for that cause to public officials.222 The
transparency, or visibility, of public expression can create positive cascades in
terms of public support, publicity, or policy change.223
Second, official regulation of public expression has tended itself to be
visible and transparent. As the recent controversy regarding the National Security
Agency’s wiretapping program demonstrates,224 the degree of regulatory
transparency affects public perceptions of the very legitimacy of government.
Traditionally, in material public places we have been able to see the tactics police
are using to restrict public speakers and public assemblies. The public becomes a
witness to these things. It is thus in a position to determine for itself whether
222
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official tactics respect basic civil liberties. Public places are among the very few
in which transparency of this sort exists.
A vast amount of expression has recently migrated online. As it continues
to go there, concerns continue to arise with regard to the transparency of
governmental efforts to monitor expression in cyber-places. This is so because
neither the speech on the Web nor its regulation is particularly transparent. The
speech there is read, not witnessed and experienced by the public and the media.
It is thus more critical than ever that we preserve at least some public space for
expression that is both transparently experienced and regulated.
C.

The Networked Public Citizen

The networking of public places will do more than raise some interesting
First Amendment issues. It will alter the experiences of place and public
expression. It will impact the First Amendment values that might ideally be
served by public places. This section examines the effects networking will have
on public expression and civic life more generally in public places. The final
section offers some modest proposals that may help preserve the critical functions
of public places.
1.

Populated Places and the Public Digital Divide

Of course, public places cannot serve any particular function unless they
are sufficiently populated. Until recently substantial barriers have existed to
maintaining network connectivity in public places. “Online” has been a condition
relating primarily to the private sphere.
Municipal wireless projects will turn entire cities and regions into
“hotspots.” Access to information and communications technologies will burgeon
even in currently underserved rural areas, further reducing the digital divide. In
vast urban and suburban areas, citizens will no longer be limited to private areas
when they wish to access the internet. Concepts like “online” and “offline” will
thus continue to lose relevance, at least for many citizens, as public places
become networked. For those with access to the latest technologies, information
will flow more freely everywhere.
This networking may have the salutary effect of increasing Americans’
use of public places. It will also likely increase their use of mobile technologies
in those places.225 As some have noted, American citizens have been less likely
225
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than citizens in other countries to utilize mobile communications technologies in
public places.226 One suspected reason for this cultural divide is that in this
country we have vast areas of private space – in our homes, our workplaces, and
elsewhere – in which to engage in expression and interaction. It may also be the
case that until now, our public network connections have been too weak to
support robust use of the latest technologies in public areas. As clouds appear and
networks are strengthened, we may expect to see many people personally
computing and communicating in public places.
Those who study urban and suburban geographies might initially be
encouraged by this prospect. Indeed, the basic agenda of “new urbanist” scholars
and activists is to revive common spaces like parks and squares as centers of
interaction and community-building.227 These theorists generally believe that by
widening suburban sidewalks, planning communities around central public places,
and cutting back single-use zoning civic interaction can be greatly facilitated.228
Widely available wireless connectivity may provide citizens with a reason to
remain in public places.
Of course, mere public presence is not the primary goal. New urbanists
and other public place activists envision public places that are areas of encounter
among citizens from different backgrounds, races, and ethnicities.229 Public
expression is most vibrant when a variety of claimants engage in a variety of
speech forms. But this raises the question: Who will the networked public citizen
be? And whose identity claims will be most fully on display in newly networked
parks and squares?
The networking of public places may have the unintended negative effect
of creating new classes of haves and have-nots. A public digital divide may
develop between technologically literate groups and the still publicly
disconnected.230 The networked environment will become more and more
facilitative of digital communication. Indeed, it may render access to digital
technologies critical to public participation. But at the same time public places
providing internet access, public libraries not only helped to close a digital divide. They also
ensured that the library would remain a critical community space.
226
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227
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may become more foreign and alienating locales for those not wired for their best
uses.
Wireless clouds and pervasive personal computing may even alter the
socially acceptable uses of public places. Publicly online citizens may seek to
enforce a norm of quiet computing that suppresses noisier forms of expression
available to still-offline citizens. If they cannot enforce that norm, there is a
danger that public Netizens may retreat back into their homes and other private
spaces.
The transition to networked public places may affect the democratic
functioning of places in ways that are not immediately apparent. Always-on
connectivity may bring people into the public square. But not everyone will be
able to participate equally. New digital divisions and contests over appropriate
behavioral norms in networked places may arise. The still-offline citizen may
become further alienated, disengaged, and displaced in public, while the
networked citizen’s claims and displays may be increasingly privileged.
2.

The People -- Disconnected

Even if the people are drawn into public places, we must ask what sort of
expressive activity will take place there. What sorts of claims, displays, and
communication will occur? To serve identity, self-governance, and transparency
functions networked places must facilitate not only commercial and recreational
interaction but more substantive public communication as well. But will they?
As noted in Part II, the networking of public places will provide greater
opportunities for social networking.231 These networks will become more and
more sophisticated. This should facilitate spontaneous assemblies in public
places. Networked public assemblies, protests, and demonstrations should be
smarter than ever before, at least for those with access to up-to-date technologies.
Even if this transpires, however, protests and demonstrations constitute
only a small fraction of the public expressive culture. Ideally, public places ought
to facilitate spontaneous interactions and speech claims of all sorts, everything
from solicitation to petitioning to begging.232 Networked public places are not
231
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likely to do so, however. What we are more likely to see in networked public
places is an increasingly disconnected populace.233
Among the connected, Web access carried over public networks on
pervasive mobile devices will increase the phenomenon known as “absent
presence.”234 As sociologists and urban geographers have noted, people are
becoming increasingly disconnected from events in material places.235 This
distance has serious First Amendment implications in terms of the identity, selfgovernance, and transparency functions of public places.
Networked public citizens, their eyes cast downward and ears filled with
audio devices, may not see or hear messages other than those transmitted into
their personal bubbles.236 They will not see, hear, or experience a range of
identity claims. They will be more inclined – and more able -- to simply ignore
solicitors, proselytizers, beggars, and other marginalized speakers. In addition,
self-governance requires exposure to speakers and messages one does not agree
with and may even be initially unwilling to engage.237 But the networking of
public places will decrease chance encounters with unwanted messages.238
Speech in networked public places will also be less and less transparent.
Wireless clouds and pervasive personal computing in public will affect the very
aesthetics -- the look, feel, and experience -- of public expressive activity.
Formerly private communication forms like email and text messaging will
proliferate, while tangible and face-to-face communication continues to fade from
public venues. Networking features and practices will alter even the expressive
“noise” of public places.239 Public parks and squares will resemble offices and
other private spaces of work and recreation.
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The new urbanist philosophy suggests that if you build wider streets and
more inviting spaces then people will come. People may indeed populate more
user-friendly places. But the quality of public presence and interaction,
particularly as it concerns the exercise of public expressive liberties, is another
matter. If we turn our public places into home offices and shield ourselves in
mobile technology bubbles, people will become increasingly disconnected in
public. The phenomenon of “absent presence” will negatively affect the identity,
participation, and transparency functions of public places.
3.

The Purification of Public Places

Chance encounters and expressive noise will not be the only things
missing in networked public places. Other forms of spatial purification will also
occur. As noted, urban social critics contend that the modern built environment
places a premium on recreation and mass consumption rather than social
interaction.240 The networking of public places will exacerbate this problem in
ways we are only now beginning to appreciate. Again, public places serve their
functions best when a multitude of expressive forms – symbols, acts, and theatre –
are present.
Urban geographers have offered a very strong case to the effect that public
surveillance, in particular, will cause a purification of public places. Open and
dynamic places will be “replaced by pseudo-public spaces like those in shopping
malls, where commercial imperatives dominate and what goes on, and who
participates, is intensely regulated and tightly controlled so that profitable
consumption is maximized.”241 As these places facilitate more and more
consumption, they will leave less and less space for ordinary expressive activities.
Protest and dissent in particular may be deemed almost entirely out of
place, even in once quintessential public places, under the gaze of constant
surveillance. Professors Kang and Cuff show rather convincingly how embedded
computing in malls -- their chosen spatial paradigm -- can “control access,
facilitate policing, [and] minimize loitering[.]”242 These effects are not, of course,
limited to the spaces of malls. The combination of surveillance, digital
awareness, and constant identification may just as readily be used to control
access to and facilitate policing of parks, squares and other public places.
240

See generally VARIATIONS ON A THEME PARK: THE NEW AMERICAN CITY AND THE END OF
PUBLIC SPACE (Michael Sorkin ed., 1992); STEVEN FLUSTY, BUILDING PARANOIA: THE
PROLIFERATION OF INTERDICTORY SPACE AND THE EROSION OF SPATIAL JUSTICE (1994).
241

Michael McCahill, Beyond Foucault: Towards a Contemporary Theory of Surveillance, in
CLIVE NORRIS, JADE MORAN AND GARY ARMSTRONG (eds.), SURVEILLANCE, CLOSED CIRCUIT
TELEVISION AND SOCIAL CONTROL 52 (1998).
242
Kang & Cuff, supra note – at 121.

55

THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND NETWORKED PUBLIC PLACES
If applied across the full range of the expressive topography -- from malls
to parks to squares -- network controls may substantially affect the identity, selfgovernance, and transparency functions of public places. For instance, Kang and
Cuff note that in a mall, technology could provide “an additional, more
sophisticated and granular layer of access control.”243 Individuals might be
discouraged from entering the space of the mall by means of a “blacklist”
generated by a combination of computer algorithms and embedded tags and
devices.244 If patron identification difficulties could be resolved, perhaps by some
sort of frequent-shopper tag or card, they note the possibility of exclusion of
“those with any brush with law enforcement, mental illness, or civil disturbance
could be seen as socially reasonable.”245
Public places like squares and parks might be similarly purified of
potential threats to public order and safety. Using the full network power of video
surveillance, future biometric technologies, wireless internet data, and mobile
GPS devices, it may be possible to identify in advance and exclude certain
persons from demonstrations, campaign events, or other public gatherings. The
policing of place, which would be mostly covert, might even be used to detain or
discourage certain speakers. This is not the stuff of sci-fi fantasy. At least one
company claims to have developed “a fully automated facial recognition system
based on neural network software . . . which can scan the faces of the crowd in
‘real’ time and compare the faces with images of known ‘troublemakers’ held on
a digital database.”246 In an era when preemptive governmental intervention and
“watch lists” are increasingly becoming the norm, it is not hard to imagine
officials seeking to prevent potentially disruptive protesters from occupying
certain public places in advance.
The networking of public places may have even broader effects on the
identity and participation functions, however. Social science evidence suggests
that women, the homeless, and people of color experience being in material
public places differently than do other citizens.247 Scholars have noted that public
surveillance “raises major questions about geographic change, social control,
patterns of inclusion and exclusion . . . and the spatial dynamics of the so-called
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information society.”248 Some studies also indicate that officials use surveillance
technologies to purify public places of groups like the homeless and teenagers.
Others have shown that surveillance has targeted women for voyeuristic reasons
and has been used to profile racial minorities.249 Other groups, including
homosexuals, may also experience networked public places differently.250 Today,
of course, it is not difficult to imagine Muslim citizens living a chilled public life
in places where every word and gesture is potentially subject to official and
unofficial surveillance techniques.251
Surveillance is not the only network feature that may chill certain forms of
expression and association. Professors Kang and Cuff ask:
How likely are you to walk through the gay and lesbian studies
section of Borders if you are closeted and know that RFID readers
are locked on your body? How likely will you be to grouse about
the administration if you are an Arab American male, walking with
fellow Arab American friends, after the Department of Homeland
Security has just warned about terrorist plots in the malls?252
Eventually, embedded technologies like digital tags will raise these sorts of
concerns in all public places. A constantly authenticating spatial environment
may drive certain forms of identity and participation underground -- or at least
away from certain networked public places.253 While some may thus be
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encouraged to populate networked places by features like wireless access, others
may be deterred from doing so by other features of the networked environment.
The upshot is that in presently very difficult to quantify ways, the
networking of public places may have a leveling and sterilizing effect on public
expressive life. Certain individual and group speech activities may be less and
less visible in networked places. Certain forms of speech may begin to disappear
as the phenomenon of “anticipatory conformity” cleanses public places of all but
the most acceptable displays.254 Dissent and disruption, which are already subject
to a growing number of material spatial regulations, will be even less likely to
appear in networked public places.255
Privacy experts have noted that
surveillance and data retention tend to substantially dampen spontaneous
behavior.256 These things internalize control and produce a degree of selfvigilance.257 Whether or not any of these effects is sufficient to constitute the
prohibited “chilling” of expression, they will most certainly affect the expressive
functioning of public places.
Many of the features of networked public places will operate in a nontransparent, even covert, fashion. They will have the effects noted above in part
because people will not know to what extent they are being watched, by whom, or
for what purpose.258 The automated nature of some new surveillance methods,
the anonymity of methods of control and regulation, and a general uncertainty
about the scope and use of the public record may breed further mistrust of
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government, resentment of public officials, and consequent avoidance of public
places.259
The networking of public places will further diminish what one
geographer has called “the democratic admixture of the pavements.”260 It may
ultimately contribute to what another scholar calls “the current urban malaise.”261
In the purified public square identity claims and unconventional modes of
participation will be segregated and managed by non-transparent networking
features like surveillance and automated identification.262 Public places will be
far less attractive venues for self-governance and other public democratic
functions.
D.

Retaining the Civic Character of Public Places – Some
Modest Proposals

The networking of public places may challenge the democratic and
expressive functioning of places by creating a new public digital divide,
distracting public speakers and audiences, and further sanitizing public venues. It
is important to recognize these potential effects in advance of the full networking
of public places. There is no preventing this networking. It will happen. Indeed
it is already happening. But there are some steps that might be taken to counteract
at least some of these changes, thus preserving or at least making possible more
robust civic and expressive public places. This section briefly discusses a few
modest proposals that relate to preserving the basic First Amendment functions of
public places.
1. Ownership and Access
As access to communications technologies becomes increasingly critical
to the identity and participation functions of networked public places, differential
access to these technologies necessarily becomes a greater concern. The focus in
studies of the digital divide has thus far been on access provided in private places
like the home or public settings like schools.263 Given the strong trend toward
259
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public place networking, we must now also begin to address a nascent divide that
will affect public expressive space on a large scale.
In the not-so-distant future, access to the latest technologies of
communication will be required for effective communication – with government
in some cases and with fellow citizens in others -- in public places. Thus the
manner in which municipalities provide public Web access will be critically
important to public expression. To maintain the leveling quality of public places,
it will be increasingly important that as many citizens as possible have access to
the latest technologies.
It is important that municipalities that provide wireless public access own
their networks. Like roads, wireless networks will require continuous upgrades.
Individual companies or groups of service providers may not be willing to
undertake the necessary repairs. In addition, by owning the networks officials can
ensure that the public has open access to them. Like the streets themselves,
wireless clouds should not be subject to a myriad of private access restrictions. If
cities are committed to providing this new means of communication, they should
be willing to invest substantially in the expressive infrastructure of the future.
In addition, the provision of “tiered” public access is particularly
troublesome. The desire to subsidize public costs is understandable. Public
internet access ought, however, to be freely available to members of the public.
There should not be classes of wireless connectivity, with the highest speeds and
applications available only to those with the means to pay. This would be like
restricting some citizens to a virtual sidewalk while others speed past on a moving
sidewalk. There are, of course, circumstances in which citizens are required to
pay for access to the means of communication. For example, permitting schemes
for demonstrations and parades sometimes require pre-insurance or the posting of
a bond.264 But these requirements generally relate to possible damage that might
result from the expressive activity. The public Web platform – the clouds and
meshes above public areas -- is not characterized by scarcity or any other cost
resulting from specific or additional users. Thus there ought to be no permit fee
for public wireless use.
Access concerns extend beyond wireless portals. In the fully networked
environment a mere internet connection will not suffice to facilitate effective
expression. Public citizens will need the appropriate mobile technologies as well.
These mobile devices will link people to the public network. Hand-held, worn,
and schools).
264
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and portable communications technologies will become basic requisites for
communicating with institutions and governments. Public safety announcements,
for example, may be delivered over public networks. Devices will also be needed
for social networking and collective public action. A “datasense” will be required
for full participation in public life. Governments of course have no constitutional
obligation to subsidize access to the latest communications technologies. But if
they are going to facilitate public connectivity then they should also consider
supporting access as well to the communicative technologies needed to
communicate in a networked environment. 265
2. Regulatory Transparency
As noted, surveillance may substantially affect use of networked public
places. Citizens’ knowledge of official access and other controls in public places
may turn out to be critical to the functioning of public places and public
expression.
Governments should start now to develop protocols and regulations that
limit public surveillance activity and the collection and retention of citizen data.266
Adoption of surveillance programs should be the result of an open and transparent
public process. Among other things, communities should seriously and publicly
debate whether they need a surveillance system at all. Installation should be
based not on whether federal or state funds are available but a fair assessment of
whether public surveillance of an area is actually needed to address a real safety
or security concern. Any surveillance program should be closely tailored to the
publicly stated governmental purpose supporting it.267 This tailoring should
include the degree of surveillance sophistication needed to serve official purposes.
Biometrics and other invasive technologies should be rarely, if ever, used to
monitor public places.
Permanent surveillance of the sort currently operated by the National Park
Service should also not be used in public places.268 Its use is fundamentally
inconsistent with the history, tradition, and functions of places like the National
Mall. Even in the ordinary public square, always- or usually-on surveillance
cameras should not be implemented absent a clear and publicly justified safety
concern. Again, there must be public input as to any proposed surveillance.
265
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Public debate regarding any such programs should include serious consideration
of their effects on public liberties like expression and association.269
As importantly, citizens should have assurances that the public data trails
they leave behind are not being collected, stored, mined, or used for improper
purposes. This observation applies to Muni WiFi programs and surveillance
camera programs alike. It is not enough that municipalities commit not to mine
private data. Officials must consider protocols and regulations for the storage,
retention, and retrieval of public WiFi data. With respect to both Muni WiFi and
public surveillance programs, officials should create technological and
administrative safeguards that will encrypt publicly transmitted data, limit access
to that data, and provide clear guidelines for non-law enforcement access to
surveillance records.270 Once again, adoption of these protocols and regulations
should be the result of an open public process.
Public transparency and accountability will not ensure that expressive and
associate chill or the sanitizing of public places will not occur. But these are
minimal steps that can and should be taken to assure citizens that public places
remain open to identity claims and participatory self-governance.271 It is
unfortunate that surprisingly few governments have taken any of these steps to
date.272 The National Park Service, for example, has neither sought public input
with respect to its surveillance practices on the National Mall and other critical
public properties nor disclosed the nature or extent of that surveillance program to
the public. It is precisely this sort of lack of transparency that will lead to
avoidance and purification of public places.
3. Protest Tactics, “Sousveillance,” and Civil Disobedience
Even with these safeguards, we will sometimes be watched when we are
in public. We cannot rely solely on governments to provide transparency. Public
places are ultimately a matter of public responsibility. Just as civil rights
protesters experimented with the sit-in and other expressive actions in response to
official controls, so too must the modern citizen think and act more creatively to
preserve spaces for public expressive activity.
As mentioned earlier, technological advances associated with the
networking of public places might be used to the advantage of public protesters
and demonstrators.273 With always-on public wireless networks and personal
269
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computing devices, speakers and assembles can engage in “swarming” and other
tactical maneuvers that will render public displays more effective.274 The power
of computer-enhanced social networking can be used to counteract some of the
most severe official regulations on public assembly and expression, including
material space restrictions on movement and spontaneity. Speakers will be able
to communicate with one another over vast public spaces, in real time. Official
tactics for controlling public protests and demonstrations, including corralling and
zoning public speakers, might be thwarted or at least challenged by countertactics like “snake marches” and spontaneous counter-movements.275
Smarter protests are not the only advance that may limit the repressive
effects of spatial networking. As mentioned, an army of citizen-journalists will
occupy networked public places. Their cameras will create an “unofficial” record
of what occurred before, during, and after public expressive events. On the
pragmatic front, this may serve as crucial evidence when protesters seek to defend
themselves from charges of breaching the peace, disorderly conduct, or resisting
arrest.276 More generally, however, it may restore public confidence in the ability
to act out and up in public without fearing that an “official” record of events will
be the only record available in subsequent proceedings. Private surveillance will
contribute to public regulatory transparency, as the police and other officials are
themselves constrained by surveillance.
The use of cameras at protests is merely one form of “sousveillance,” or
surveillance from below. Electrical engineers and sociologists are currently
partnering to design wearable computers that in effect watch our official
watchers.277 This inverse or counter-surveillance resituates the technologies of
surveillance, essentially turning the tables on authorities. Sousveillance does not
eliminate public surveillance. But it may encourage people to engage and dispute
274
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rather than fear and thus avoid public surveillance – and public places. It signals
to authorities that citizens are aware of but not intimidated by the presence of
surveillance devices. In this sense sousveillance can be an empowering activity.
Recording events and publishing them to the Web in real space and time
will also permit protesters to bypass media filters that tend to distort protest
messages. Citizen-journalists can create and publish a Web page as events
unfold. Members of an assembly can determine the content of these presentations
as well as their focus as published.
In addition to engaging in their own forms of counter-surveillance,
citizens can also resist technologies through non-compliance and even in some
cases active interference with cameras.278 They can, for example, force
governmental transparency by sharing information on the Web about the location
of surveillance cameras. A creative group known as the Surveillance Camera
Players uses a form of street theatre to highlight and expose the location and
operation of cameras in New York City.279 This very mild form of civil
disobedience actually uses a combination of public speech, assembly, and
network technology to impose transparency on public surveillance programs.
New restrictions on public expression call for new tactics of resistance.
Counter-surveillance and public awareness campaigns can be effective in drawing
attention to and imposing transparency on public surveillance systems. This may
provide some assurance and confidence to public protesters otherwise concerned
about the repressive effects of networked public places.
4. Laws, Norms, and Architectures
How the networking of public places ultimately affects public expressive
behavior will ultimately depend upon some combination of laws, social norms,
and architectures.280 Legislators could of course pass new laws to deal with
things live “drive-by pornography,” public spamming, and new forms of cyberstalking. Citizens might adjust their behaviors to take the effects of new
technologies on public life into account. Engineers could create products that
facilitate selective receipt of speech and permit surveillance without destroying
public liberties.
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If there is one clear lesson from the analysis of networked places in this
Article it is that laws will be increasingly ineffective in terms of regulating public
expression. In many cases networked expression will be too slippery to be
regulated, too disconnected from material places to be effectively policed.
Enacting new laws will not preserve the democratic functions of public places.
Norms and architectures will be far more effective than laws in terms of
protecting us from harmful public speech and preserving public anonymity.281
We will all have to learn to live with the thrusting of expression we find
offensive and distasteful. This will require honing our ability to selectively
consume information. It will require some community policing of public places –
parents shielding children from sexually explicit information, and public shaming
of “dirty drivers” and consumers of pornography in public parks and on public
subways, trains, and buses.282 Like the traditional press, citizen-journalists armed
with cameras and recorders will have to exercise restraint in training their devices
on private actors in public places. We will all have to become more mindful that
in casting our eyes downward and plugging our ears, we are destroying aspects of
the public expressive culture.
Most important, perhaps, will be the architectures of computer codes for
the devices we wear and carry and the environment we will inhabit. The key will
be to design codes that will simultaneously facilitate the open exchange of
information and monitor space in a fashion that preserves that same openness.
Software engineers and the architectures they construct will be far more important
to networked expressive culture than legislative or executive decrees. 283 These
architectures will establish protocols of protection from unwanted or harassing
public expression delivered from mobile devices. They will permit us to
authenticate our identity or mask it.
Governments are responsible for taking expressive liberties into account
as they commission new systems and digitize the public environment. We are all
of course responsible for using products and programs in a manner that preserves
public expressive liberties. As compelling as our own sound tracks may be, we
must recognize that we miss much by heavily filtering our public experiences.
Of course, none of these rather modest proposals will guarantee a return to
public places or a robust public expressive culture there. But as public places
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become networked, we must begin to consider how we might preserve the
identity, self-governance, and transparency functions of public places.

V. Conclusion
We have arrived at a critical period of transition in terms of public places
and public expression. The material places we have traditionally occupied -- and
which have substantially influenced norms, expectations, and legal doctrines
relating to public expression -- are becoming highly networked. As a result,
traditional distinctions between “private” and “public” speech, and “online” and
“offline” presence, are rapidly fading into extinction.
The First Amendment implications of the progression toward networked
public places are serious. Much depends on the scope and use of technological
advances. Already, however, we can be relatively certain that public citizens will
become more captive to certain forms of unwanted expression, more known (or at
least knowable) to governmental authorities as they gather and speak in public,
and less and less personally engaged in expressive communion with one another
in public places. There are pressing questions with regard to whether, and if so
how, old First Amendment doctrines and principles might be transported into
modernized places.
Of even larger concern are the prospects for continued self-governance
through and in public places. Reducing the spaces of “offline” presence by
providing public wireless networks may replenish public places to some degree.
But the people there will be less connected as a result of the pervasive personal
computing they will bring with them. The squares and parks they will occupy
will likely be even more purified and sterile than the commercialized malls many
public places have already become. Certain marginalized groups and activities
may be even less welcome in networked public places than they have been in
traditional material ones.
We cannot reverse the progression toward networked public places. The
forces trending in this direction are much too strong. The features of public place
networking that are most threatening to public expression can, however, be
managed. If the public square is to be networked, then governments must
concentrate on expanding access to crucial means of public communication, both
in terms of wireless access and the tools that ensure public connectivity. Citizens
must press officials to make the networking of public places a more transparent
and politically legitimate process. They must also learn to use new technologies
to enhance their own expressive liberties.
Public citizens must use
communication devices responsibly such that they do not infringe on the public
liberties of others. In networked public places, formal laws and constitutional
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principles will matter less to the scope of expressive liberties than will new
computer codes and the behavioral norms that shape their applications.
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